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LINKING NGO ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE 
LEGITIMACY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
Dana Brakman Reiser and Claire R. Kelly* 
ommentators often express concern over whether global regulators 
suffer from a democracy deficit and sometimes offer nongovern-
mental organizations (“NGOs”) participation in these entities as a cure 
for this ill. To serve such an ameliorative role and to be legitimate actors 
in international civil society more generally, though, the internal ac-
countability of participating NGOs matters. NGOs need to be composed 
and governed accountably in order to legitimate their role in global gov-
ernance. Current domestic nonprofit law, which forms the basis for how 
NGOs are governed internally, attempts to create an effective and en-
forceable regime of nonprofit accountability. These governance and ac-
countability frameworks offered by domestic law, however, provide in-
sufficient content to appropriately regulate and incentivize NGOs work-
ing internationally. This Article demonstrates how global regulators can 
help fill this gap, thereby improving NGO accountability and the legiti-
macy of global regulation. 
Part I reviews the roles that NGOs play in global governance. NGOs 
regulate third party conduct themselves and also influence the regulatory 
efforts of other global governance entities. Part I also examines how 
scholars typically assess the legitimacy of global regulators. Part II then 
reviews the basic accountability regimes applied to NGOs by domestic 
nonprofit law, primarily using U.S. law as an example. It describes how 
domestic enforcement mechanisms affect NGO accountability, highlight-
ing the differential emphasis these mechanisms place on NGOs’ mission, 
organizational, and financial accountability. We argue that while domes-
tic nonprofit law provides some measure of legitimacy to NGO regulato-
ry efforts internationally, it falls short in several ways that matter. The 
gaps in nonprofit mission, organizational, and financial accountability 
enforcement call into question the ability of NGOs to pursue normative 
goals; the value of NGOs’ participation in the global regulatory process; 
and the suitability of NGOs as a proper site for regulation. International 
organizations can serve as gatekeepers that ameliorate these accountabil-
ity gaps. 
Part III looks both at how global regulators can serve as gatekeepers 
and how they can better utilize NGOs as part of their legitimacy strate-
gies. Some global regulators have established accreditation, monitoring, 
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and enforcement systems for their participating NGOs. However, not all 
global regulators that capitalize on NGO participation have such mecha-
nisms in place, or have mechanisms that are suited to the task. These sys-
tems can be improved by structuring them to reflect the role of NGOs in 
each regulator’s legitimacy strategy and to complement domestic non-
profit accountability regimes. If the NGOs that participate in global regu-
lation are themselves not sufficiently accountable, they may undermine, 
rather than bolster, the legitimacy of global regulation. Finally, this Part 
makes suggestions on how to safeguard NGOs’ role in global regulators’ 
legitimacy strategies. Part IV briefly concludes. 
I. REGULATORS, LEGITIMACY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. NGOs as Regulators in Global Governance 
NGOs contribute to global governance in two ways that implicate their 
legitimacy. First, they act as non-State regulators (“NSRs”). They influ-
ence behavior by setting standards, establishing best practices, and cam-
paigning for particular actions.1 Second, they influence the regulatory 
efforts of other NSRs, such as international organizations and transgov-
ernmental networks.2 All NSRs need legitimacy to different degrees, and 
NGO participation is often used to enhance legitimacy. 
NGOs regulate. Regulation involves the attempt to alter the behavior 
of actors through various means.3 Regulators may attempt to impose 
norms through hard law (statutes, treaties, regulations) or through soft 
law (norms, guides, best practices, and voluntary codes of conduct). In-
ternationally, a host of NSRs seek to modify conduct including interna-
tional organizations, transgovernmental networks, and NGOs. NGOs 
may act independently as NSRs or contribute to the efforts of other 
NSRs.4 
                                                                                                             
 1. Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Con-
temporary Governance, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 56, 60 (2002) (giving as an example Amnesty 
International, Transparency International, and Greenpeace International as “private over-
seers of national governments”). 
 2. Indeed Ahmed and Potter document how some NGOs view themselves as not 
only “creating their own networks across national boundaries but [] assuming interna-
tional roles historically the preserve of the states.” SHAMIMA AHMED & DAVID M. 
POTTER, NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 69 (2006). 
 3. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Poly-
centric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 139 (2008) [hereinafter Black, 
Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy]. 
 4. See Julia Black, Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory Share 10–11 
(Lon. Sch. Econ. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 14/2009, 2009) [hereinafter Black, 
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NGOs cannot create hard law, but they may create soft law through 
campaigns, codes, or standards.5 For example, the International Stand-
ards Organization (“ISO”), an international NGO, devises standards that 
States or private actors may choose to employ.6 The standards propagat-
ed by NGOs, while not hard law, may influence conduct nonetheless and 
contribute to polycentric regulatory regimes.7 Thus, for example, in 1992 
a coalition of NGOs8 formed to begin the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (“ICBL”). This effort eventually led to the 1997 Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,9 banning landmines.10 
Subsequently, the ICBL became a steering member of the Cluster Muni-
tions Coalition which promotes the Cluster Munitions Convention.11 
Thus, even though NGOs cannot make law they can contribute in im-
portant ways to the development and implementation of law. 
NGOs also contribute to the regulatory efforts of other NSRs.12 NGOs 
lobby and influence national, international, and transgovernmental bod-
                                                                                                             
Competition for Regulatory Share], available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2009-14_Black.pdf. 
 5. See AHMED & POTTER, supra note 2, at 15 (arguing that NGOs do have the power 
to persuade and although communicating without coercion NGOs build upon and change 
international and interstate relations); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 
Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Over-
coming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 544 (2009) (discuss-
ing bottom up regulation by NGOs); Scott, supra note 1, at 60–68. 
 6. See About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 7. See Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 146 (NGOs 
generate awareness amongst consumers which results in economic pressure on market 
actors to conform to norms of all or a selected group of legitimacy communities.); see 
also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at 505–07  (discussing regulatory standard setting 
and transnational new governance). 
 8. These NGOs include Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Handicap In-
ternational, Physicians for Human Rights, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, and 
the Mines Advisory Group. Campaign History, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/About-Us/History (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) [herein-
after Campaign History]. 
 9. Mine Ban Treaty, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties (last visited Mar. 18, 
2011). 
 10. Campaign History, supra note 8. 
 11. Governance Bodies, CLUSTER MUNITION COAL., 
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-coalition/steering-committee/ (last visited Mar. 
18, 2011). 
 12. NGOs also often seek to influence national governments through domestic politi-
cal processes. 
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ies.13 Many, if not most, international bodies also have some mechanism 
to allow for participation by civil society.14 In fact, some international 
bodies welcome NGO participation as part of their own legitimacy strat-
egies.15 The United Nations 2004 Cardoso Report, recognizing the im-
portance of embracing civil society participation, noted that “[t]he grow-
ing participation and influence of non-State actors is enhancing democ-
racy and reshaping multilateralism. Civil society organizations are also 
the prime movers of some of the most innovative initiatives to deal with 
emerging global threats.”16 
NSRs need legitimacy to garner compliance with their norms.17 They 
need legitimacy to enlist support for their efforts.18 NSRs sometimes seek 
NGO participation as part of their legitimacy strategies, both because 
NGOs may enhance input legitimacy through increased participation and 
output legitimacy because they have the credentials to speak to the nor-
mative issues at stake. Of course, when NGOs act as NSRs, they also 
want to improve both their input and output legitimacy. These important 
concepts and the role of NGOs in creating input and output legitimacy 
are discussed below. 
B. Assessing Legitimacy and Accountability  
Although legitimacy can be discussed as either a descriptive19 or socio-
logical matter,20 we approach it here from the latter perspective, i.e., as 
                                                                                                             
 13. See AHMED & POTTER, supra note 2, at 44–53. NGO participation in international 
organizations and transgovernmental networks has not gone unchallenged. In particular, 
such participation raises questions about state sovereignty, the equality of the states, and 
democratic accountability of these global regulators. NGOs have answered these claims 
in part with reference to their own legitimacy. Id. at 245–50. 
 14. See UN Charter art. 71: “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable 
arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned 
with matters in its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international or-
ganizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with 
the Member of the United Nations concerned.” 
 15. See Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3. 
 16. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and 
Global Governance: Rep. of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Soci-
ety Relations, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 11, 2004) [hereinafter Cardoso Report]. 
 17. See AHMED & POTTER, supra note 2, at 14–15, 241–44; see also Steve Charnovitz, 
Accountability of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance 30–31 
(Geo. Wash. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 145, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=716381&download=yes (explaining 
that NGOs care about their influence and would be eager to improve accountability). 
 18. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 154. 
 19. By descriptive we mean that as a matter of objective fact something is legitimate. 
Describing something as legitimate requires a normative baseline. Thus, descriptive legit-
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socially constructed. Something is legitimate because people perceive it 
as legitimate.21 Although it is impossible to assess a perception, one can 
still assess what perceptions should, or will likely, be by looking at legit-
imacy criteria. Moreover, we believe NSRs will consider legitimacy cri-
teria in order to improve perceptions of themselves as legitimate. 
Generally speaking, commentators have identified two types of legiti-
macy criteria worth considering. Normative (output) legitimacy criteria 
focuses on whether an institution effectively promotes what is right, ac-
ceptable, desired, or just.22 Will the product of the global regulator be a 
good one?23 Will it be effective, fair, well-ordered, universally accepted, 
morally defensible, or supportive of a particular goal such as human 
rights or trade liberalization?24 Thus, output legitimacy assumes a norma-
tive prescription of what is a good outcome.25 One might assume, for 
example, that to be legitimate an institution must respect human rights,26 
or at minimum, institutions “are legitimate only if they do not persist in 
                                                                                                             
imacy is sometimes referred to as normative legitimacy because the description reflects 
the notion that the thing is normatively desirable. First, an institution is descriptively 
legitimate if, after one accepts a normative premise of what is right, good, acceptable, 
desired, or appropriate, one determines as an objective fact that an institution meets these 
criteria. Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 405, 406 (2006). 
 20. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 144; see also 
Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 19, at 406. Other commentators have identified regula-
tory legitimacy as a separate concept pertaining to the legitimacy of NGOs within inter-
national governance institutions such as the UN or the World Bank. See Anton Vedder, 
Questioning the Legitimacy of Non-Governmental Organizations, in NGO INVOLVEMENT 
IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY: SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY 1, 5 (Anton Ved-
der ed., 2007) [hereinafter NGO INVOLVEMENT] . 
 21. See Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 144 (internal 
citation omitted); see also Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 19, at 406. Either approach 
requires that we assess the underlying criteria; either we must agree on what the norma-
tive baseline is to argue that something either is or is not descriptively legitimate, or we 
must identify criteria that people consider when they develop their perceptions. 
 22. See Claire R. Kelly, The Politics of Legitimacy in the UNCITRAL Working Meth-
ods, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 106, 124 (Tomer Broude, Marc 
L. Busch & Amelia Porges eds., 2010) [hereinafter Kelly, UNCITRAL]. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Legitimacy and effectiveness are linked. See id. Likewise, international and na-
tional legitimacy are linked. As countries become more democratic the calls for legitima-
cy become more pronounced. See Jeffrey Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 451, 460 (2001). 
 25. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 19, at 418 (discussing the persistent disagree-
ment over the norms underlying legitimacy). 
 26. Id. 
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violations of the least controversial human rights.”27 Alternatively, one 
might require that an institution be effective.28 Of course, observers con-
textualize “effectiveness” in a way that requires a normative position. 
The trade regime is effective if it liberalizes trade.29 The child labor re-
gime is effective if it eliminates the worst forms of child labor.30 One 
must start with a normative prescription of what it is that one wants to 
accomplish.31 
Once an NSR has a normative prescription, its legitimacy might bene-
fit from NGO participation. NGOs may have invested in the normative 
goals that the NSR seeks to regulate. They might be experts in the policy 
or technical matters that the NSR addresses. They may have engaged in 
significant deliberation that lends credibility to their views. An NSR may 
benefit from NGO participation, not only from greater input legitimacy, 
but also because the NGO can help the NSR achieve a good outcome 
according to its own defined prescription of the good. 
The second criteria, procedural (input) legitimacy criteria, assess the 
participation in, and the process of, decision making. Administrative law 
devices such as transparency,32 opportunities for comment,33 power shar-
ing,34 and review,35 improve the functioning of organizations.36 These 
devices may promote better decisions by creating more deliberation, 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. at 420. The authors explain that it is difficult to categorize human rights be-
cause what many commonly refer to as “rights,” are actually protective mechanisms for 
“basic human interests.” Id. at 419. 
 28. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, ECONOMIC PAPER SERIES NO. 85, REFORM OF 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: TOWARDS A COMMONWEALTH AGENDA 1–5 (2009). 
 29. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, pmbl., 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 30. See ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action 
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, June 17, 1999, 2133 
U.N.T.S.161; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 31. Claire R. Kelly, Financial Crisis and Civil Society, 11 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 505, 536 
(2011). 
 32. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Ad-
ministrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1530 (2006). 
 33. Id. at 1527–28. 
 34. Id. at 1534–36. 
 35. Id. at 1535–36. 
 36. Id. at 1534–37 (discussing how horizontal and vertical power-sharing mecha-
nisms can increase the legitimacy of international rulemaking); see also Nico Krisch & 
Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in 
the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2006) (noting the tendency of IOs 
to improve participation and accountability by incorporating various administrative law 
mechanisms into their decision-making, including procedures for notice-and-comment). 
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more reasoned decision making, and more accountability.37 NSRs may 
seek NGO participation because such participation facilitates better pro-
cedures. NGOs may foster transparency and opportunity for comment. 
Additionally, decisions are more legitimate when those affected by the 
decision are included in the process of making it.38 It would be difficult, 
if not impossible, for international organizations and transgovernmental 
networks to be democratic,39 but they can broaden participation by en-
gaging NGOs as well as private parties.40 Greater participation hopefully 
leads to better deliberation. NGOs, for example, often raise issues that 
would otherwise not be considered,41 either directly or by lobbying na-
tional governments to broach new issues in international fora. Thus, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision might provide notice and 
comment procedures for its proposals to which NGOs might respond.42 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) might invite NGO experts to participate in its working 
groups.43 
Legitimacy relates to but should not be confused with accountability.44 
As discussed below, scholars differ over NGO accountability. Accounta-
bility can mean that the organization has a responsibility to a certain 
                                                                                                             
 37. See Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and 
the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 
163–78 (2005). 
 38. See Yves Bonzon, Institutionalizing Public Participation in WTO Decision Mak-
ing: Some Conceptual Hurdles and Avenues, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 751, 753–56 (2008). 
 39. Esty, supra note 32, at 1515–16. 
 40. See Henry W. McGee, Jr. & Timothy W. Woolsey, Transboundary Dispute Reso-
lution as a Process and Access to Justice for Private Litigants: Commentaries on Cesare 
Romano’s the Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes: A Pragmatic 
Approach (2000), 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 109, 116 (2002). 
 41. AHMED & POTTER, supra note 2, at 82. 
 42. See Stephany Griffith-Jones & Kevin Young, Reforming Governance of Interna-
tional Financial Regulation; Have the G20 Done Enough?, (Initiative for Pol’y Dialogue, 
Policy Brief, 2009), available at http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/Griffith-
Jones_Young_Policy_Brief.pdf. 
 43. David Satola & W.J. Luddy, Jr., The Potential for an International Legal Ap-
proach to Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 315, 326 
(2007). 
 44. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 138. The ques-
tion of legality is another separate issue. Anton Vedder, Questioning the Legitimacy of 
Non-Governmental Organizations, in NGO INVOLEMENT, supra note 20, at 9 [hereinafter 
Vedder, Questioning the Legitimacy]. Like accountability it can be considered a neces-
sary though not sufficient factor. Id. 
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stakeholder or stakeholders.45 These stakeholders may be governments, 
donors, boards, members, employees, or people affected by the NGO’s 
actions.46 NGOs may be accountable to these stakeholders for their fi-
nances, their policies, and their effectiveness.47 
Accountability matters because it fosters the perception of legitima-
cy.48 It involves a “discourse of accountability.” 49 As Julia Black argues: 
Auditing, for example, is not simply an accountability tool which can 
be used to give an account of financial expenditure, or indeed increas-
ing performance in achieving a wide range of social objective, such as 
sustainable development, ethical labour practices, and so on, as the 
growing practices of social auditing illustrate. Judicial review is not 
simply the application of a set of legal norms to the behaviour of public 
actors. Deliberative polyarchies which engage regulators in democratic 
deliberation and in which regulators are called to give account are not 
simply the engagement of the public in reviewing actions of regulators. 
Rather, each is an interpretive and discursive schema through which 
participants in the accountability relationship make sense of their own 
and each others’ roles, which is constitutive of their relationship and 
which is fundamentally shaped by it. 50 
Thus the process of accounting can foster the perception of legitimacy. 
C. Problems Assessing Legitimacy and Accountability 
Assessing global regulators’ legitimacy raises a number of problems. 
First, NSRs will seek NGO participation as a strategy to improve both 
output and input legitimacy criteria.51 These efforts should be closely 
                                                                                                             
 45. AHMED & POTTER, supra note 2, at 126; see also L. DAVID BROWN, CREATING 
CREDIBILITY: LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 3, 
36 (2008) [hereinafter BROWN, CREATING CREDIBILITY]. 
 46. See AHMED & POTTER, supra note 2, at 126–27; see also BROWN, CREATING 
CREDIBILITY, supra note 45, at 3, 36. 
 47. See L. DAVID BROWN & JAGADANANDA, CIVICUS, CIVIL SOCIETY LEGITIMACY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/LTA_ScopingPaper.pdf; see also AHMED & POTTER, 
supra note 2, at 126–27  (Questions of accountability often leave out NGO responsibility 
to their clients. Instead, concerns are raised about caving to donor demands and respon-
siveness to multiple stakeholders.). 
 48. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 148–49. 
 49. Id. at 152. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, ‘Global Civil Society’: A Sceptical View, 
in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 26, 26 (Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, & Mary Kaldor, 
eds., 2005) (noting the “intertwined quests of legitimacy” of NGOs and international 
organizations that results in an undemocratic system and “drives the severe inflation of 
ideological rhetoric surrounding claims about ‘global civil society’”). 
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scrutinized because they may not improve legitimacy. Second, NSRs, as 
regulators, as well as the subjects they regulate, are constantly changing 
in response to each other as well as other forces. Any measure of legiti-
macy must take into account that dynamic process and the effect that it 
has on the desirable balance of output and input criteria.52 Finally, the 
relationship between legitimacy and accountability is muddy. Accounta-
bility promotes legitimacy, but in some ways accountability is self-
defining and therefore difficult to assess objectively. 
First, NSRs pursue strategies to improve their legitimacy criteria in-
cluding promoting NGO participation as a legitimacy enhancer.53 The 
value of NGO participation in global governance, either as a regulator or 
as a participant in the efforts of another regulator, cannot be taken as a 
given.54 NGO participation may successfully help an NSR build legiti-
macy if it in fact contributes to the efficacy of the NSR and thus im-
proves its output legitimacy, or if it participates in a meaningful way and 
thereby improves its input legitimacy.55 Whether it will succeed at either 
depends not only on whether the NSR allows for real participation (ra-
ther than just the veneer of NGO participation),56 but also on the bona 
                                                                                                             
 52. Kelly, UNCITRAL, supra note 22, at 124–25. 
 53. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 146–47. Seeking 
NGO participation is part of attempting to build legitimacy. As Julia Black notes: 
Managing [] legitimacy encompasses building legitimacy, maintaining it, and 
repairing it once lost. Organizations can manage their legitimacy by attempting 
to conform to the legitimacy claims that are made on them; they can seek to 
manipulate them; or they can select from among their environments audiences 
(legitimacy communities) that will support them. The form that the strategy 
takes will vary with the type of legitimacy that is in issue: pragmatic legitimacy 
(based on self interested claims of legitimacy communities); moral or norma-
tive legitimacy (based on assessments that this is the ‘right thing to do’); or 
cognitive legitimacy (based on assumptions that things could not be any other 
way); and on whether the organization is seeking to build, maintain or repair 
legitimacy. 
Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Cardoso Report, supra note 16, ¶ 140. 
 55. But see Anderson & Rieff, supra note 51, at 29–30 (specifically rejecting the 
argument that NGOs can help improve democratic legitimacy). 
 56. Assessing legitimacy requires that observers consider the means by which an 
organization pursues legitimacy. An organization may manage the perception that it is or 
is not legitimate without addressing that legitimacy as a normative matter. An organiza-
tion might take superficial steps to appear more legitimate than it is. Thus, some compa-
nies for example make unjustified environmental claims in order to better their image 
(i.e., green-washing). Greenpeace defines “green washing” as “the cynical use of envi-
ronmental themes to whitewash corporate misbehavior.” Introduction to StopGreen-
wash.org, GREENPEACE, http://www.stopgreenwash.org/introduction (last visited Mar. 18, 
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fides of the NGO itself. An NGO without a clearly defined mission is not 
in a good position to improve the output legitimacy of an NSR. As dis-
cussed below, an NGO that is poorly governed, opaque, or being used for 
the financial benefit of its managers is not in a good position to improve 
the input legitimacy of an NSR. In fact, these and other lapses in partici-
pating NGO accountability could harm an NSR’s legitimacy. 
Second, any assessment of legitimacy must be dynamic because insti-
tutions and the measures by which we judge them are constantly chang-
ing. International organizations address a range of different issues over 
time. These organizations respond to world events.57 The key players in 
the organizations change. The organizations compete with each other for 
legitimacy and therefore develop strategies to improve their own legiti-
macy.58 NGOs respond to these changes because they themselves evolve, 
compete, and seek legitimacy from their participation in global govern-
ance.59 As NGOs evolve, the international organizations and transgov-
ernmental networks respond in kind. The dynamic evolution of NSRs 
means that the normative baseline for both NSRs and NGOs are, in im-
portant ways, always subject to change. Both NSRs and NGOs must con-
stantly assess their own missions and whether they align with each other. 
The struggle to identify a stable normative baseline in a constantly 
shifting world is compounded by the fact that there is an ongoing debate 
concerning the appropriate balance of output and input legitimacy. Bu-
chanan and Keohane, for example, make the case that organizations 
should possess “minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit and 
                                                                                                             
2011). An organization may adopt procedures that appear to make it more procedurally 
legitimate but in fact have no effect on how the organization operates. The Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision sought public comments on its work—it received not 
comments from the public generally, but rather predominantly received comments from 
members of the banking industry. Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Adminis-
trative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 26 (2006). It may be that an 
organization masks its lack of legitimacy by association with another organization or 
group that has legitimacy. Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Derivative Legiti-
macy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 646 (2008). 
 57. See Financial Crisis: What the World Bank is Doing, WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); see also Int’l 
Monetary Fund [IMF], World Economic Outlook: Financial Stress, Downturns, and Re-
coveries (Oct. 17, 2008). For the Basel Committee’s response to the financial crisis, see 
Monetary & Financial Stability, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/fincriscomp.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 58. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 154. 
 59. For example, Professors Ahmed and Potter note that “being awarded consultative 
status [in the UN] gives NGOs a legitimate place within the political system. This means 
that the NGO activist is seen as having a right to be involved in the process.” AHMED & 
POTTER, supra note 2, at 53. 
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institutional integrity.”60 Simon Caney argues that international econom-
ic institutions should be judged by a hybrid standard that accounts for 
persons’ “most fundamental rights” and provides a “fair political frame-
work in which to determine which principles of justice should be adopted 
to regulate the global political economy.”61 Daniel Esty suggests adop-
tion of a host of administrative law tools allowing procedural rigor to 
support “supranational policy making.”62 It is impossible to say with cer-
tainty where the line should be drawn. At best, we can assess whether 
various groups perceive a particular mix as appropriate. Unfortunately, 
different audiences may vary in their perceptions63 as a result of both 
different measures of whether an organization has met its stated goal (has 
it been effective) and also different views about the goal itself (what is a 
worthy goal). World pluralism makes the hope for an objective norma-
tive standard impossible.64 
Third, legitimacy depends in part on accountability, but accountability 
is an elusive criterion itself. Stakeholders perceive an organization as 
legitimate when that organization is accountable.65 Accountability may 
be to a person (a stakeholder) or an idea (a mission).66 Accountability to 
a person is problematic because accountability is audience-dependent 
                                                                                                             
 60. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 19, at 419. Additionally, they would require as 
necessary conditions that the organizations have the “ongoing consent of democratic 
states” as well as epistemic virtues to make credible judgments about the needed criteria 
and the ability to reassess the criteria and “to achieve the ongoing contestation and criti-
cal revision of their goals, their terms of accountability, and ultimately their role in a 
division of labor for the pursuit of global justice, through their interaction with effective 
epistemic agents.” Id. at 432–33; see also Vedder, Questioning the Legitimacy, supra 
note 44, at 7. 
 61. Simon Caney, The Responsibilities and Legitimacy of Economic International 
Institutions, in LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE & PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (Lukas Meyer 
ed., 2009). 
 62. Esty, supra note 32, at 1537–42. 
 63. Vedder, Questioning the Legitimacy, supra note 44, at 14 (discussing inevitable 
normative conflict with respect to NGOs). 
 64. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 19, at 418–22. Buchanan and Keohane identify 
the problem as the persistence of normative disagreement about “first, what the proper 
goals of the institution are (given the limitations imposed by state sovereignty properly 
conceived), second, what global justice requires, and third, what role if any the institution 
should play in the pursuit of global justice.” Id. at 418. 
 65. Vedder, Questioning the Legitimacy, supra note 44, at 6–10. 
 66. BROWN, CREATING CREDIBILITY, supra note 45, at 36; Alnoor Ebrahim, Towards 
a Reflective Accountability in NGOs, in GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITIES: PARTICIPATION, 
PLURALISM AND PUBLIC ETHICS 193, 195–98 (Alnoor Ebrahim  & Edward Weisband eds., 
2007); BROWN & JAGADANANDA, supra note 47, at 5, 9. 
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and ever changing.67 NGOs may also be accountable to a mission, how-
ever, missions may sometimes evolve. Although an NGO’s mission can 
be legitimately transformed over time, doing so requires using govern-
ance mechanisms that enable a dialogue among stakeholders.68 
In the NGO context, though, there are almost always multiple parties 
from whom legitimacy is sought and accountability to all of them will 
likely be impossible.69 For this reason, we prefer to assess accountability 
to mission, rather than accountability to a particular stakeholder.70 In this 
sense, accountability means that the organization owes fealty to achiev-
ing its particular goals or purpose, i.e., its mission.71 An organization 
may have a mission to promote higher education, aid the poor, or provide 
for the sick. This mission is an abstract principle, informed by, but inde-
pendent of, who founded the organization, who funds it, who regulates it, 
and who benefits from it. Indeed if any of those parties change or cease 
to exist, the mission remains to guide the organization in its decisions. As 
is discussed more in Part II, domestic nonprofit law regulates this type of 
accountability. 
II. DOMESTIC NONPROFIT LAW AND NGOS 
NGOs have likely been founded in every nation that encourages or tol-
erates the organized existence of nonprofits.72 For purposes of this Arti-
                                                                                                             
 67. Vedder, Questioning the Legitimacy, supra note 44, at 8 (noting the difficulty of 
identifying all the stakeholders); see also Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen Boozang, Mis-
sion, Margin and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 82 (2005) (noting the multiple stakeholders at issue in nonprofits); 
Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence Of The Nonprofit 
And For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 465 (1996) (noting 
that “most state nonprofit laws, perhaps without intending to, create agents without prin-
cipals”). 
 68. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Filling the Gaps in Nonprofit Accountability: Apply-
ing the Club Perspective in the U.S. Legal System, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS 
AND NONPROFITS (Aseem Prakash & Mary Kay Gugerty eds., 2010). 
 69. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy, supra note 3, at 153. 
 70. BROWN, CREATING CREDIBILITY, supra note 45, at 36 (“Accountability is usually 
defined in terms of performance for a particular stakeholder . . . . But CSOs have multiple 
competing stakeholders, so accountability to missions may have to balance against or 
align the multiple claims of diverse stakeholders.”). 
 71. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure 
Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 212–15 (2004) 
[hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Enron.org]. 
 72. NGOs are nonprofit organizations, but the nonprofit concept embraces a broader 
range of entities, including everything from private clubs to hospitals to domestic advo-
cacy groups. 
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cle, however, we narrow this global field to those NGOs that either oper-
ate as NSRs themselves, or engage with NSRs in an effort to impact 
global governance. As Part I explains, NGO accountability is a key fac-
tor in understanding how NGO participation can enhance the legitimacy 
of global regulators. Yet, NGO accountability is regulated, in the first 
place, on the domestic level by domestic nonprofit law.73 Many NGOs 
are formed in North American and European nations,74 and this Article 
                                                                                                             
  Jurisdictions vary greatly in the extent to which they support and welcome non-
profits. In states like the U.S., NGOs are offered legal personhood, granted rights to asso-
ciation, and provided various tax benefits. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION 
ACT (RMNCA) § 3.02 (1987) (“Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, 
every corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its corporate name and has the 
same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its 
affairs . . .”); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, pt. II (1984) (de-
scribing the right of individuals to come together in groups to engage in constitutionally 
protected expression); I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(3) (providing for deductibility of charita-
ble contributions and income tax exemption for organizations with “religious, charitable, 
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, [] educational [and a few other] purposes”). 
  In other states, NGOs are often seen as suspect, rights to associate suggest poten-
tial threats to a ruling regime, and tax benefits may be unavailable. See, e.g., Anil Kumar 
Sinha & Sapana Pradhan Malla, Nepal, in PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN SOUTH ASIA 45, 
50–54 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-13, Mark Sidel et al., May 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126337 (describing the pattern of re-
strictions imposed on Nepalese NGOs and their leaders, seemingly intended to discour-
age their formation and continuation); Kareem Elbayar, NGO Laws in Selected Arab 
States, 7 INT’L J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 3, 6 (2005) (noting that Algerian “law does not 
encourage the formation of NGOs by providing any direct or indirect financial benefits, 
such as tax exemptions or public utility discounts”); Rebecca Lee, Modernizing Charity 
Law in China, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 347, 355 (2009) (explaining that China’s gov-
ernment has “welcomed charitable organizations (including international charitable or-
ganizations) if they worked with it on issues such as education, health, environment, and 
culture” but “saw those organizations [involved in political or religious issues] as a 
source of political instability and suppressed them”) (internal citations omitted). 
  For a review of the dimensions of the nonprofit sector in various jurisdictions, see 
1 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (Lester M. Salamon et 
al. eds., 1999) and 2 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2006). 
 73. See Menno T. Kamminga, What Makes an NGO “Legitimate” in the Eyes of 
States?, in NGO INVOLVEMENT, supra note 20, at 179. 
 74. According to The World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(“WANGO”), there are 22,787 non-governmental organizations listed in North America 
and 17,630 in the four European regions (including Russia). The number of NGOs rec-
orded in the directory for the rest of the world totals 10,465. Worldwide NGO Directory, 
THE WORLD ASS’N OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGS., 
http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
Of course, NGOs formed in one jurisdiction will often have affiliates or branches in oth-
ers, and particular issues of interest arise when NGOs form related organizations in de-
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focuses primarily on nonprofit law in those jurisdictions, especially the 
U.S. This Part evaluates the content and achievements of domestic non-
profit law enforcement. In doing so, it identifies predictable accountabil-
ity gaps that threaten the ability of NGOs to play the legitimacy-
enhancing role contemplated by NSRs. 
A. Internal Structures for NGO Accountability 
Regardless of their jurisdictional home, all NGOs take some organiza-
tional form to provide for decision-making and accountability. Key to all 
of these structures is some governing organ that is authorized to make 
decisions on the NGO’s behalf. Practically, this governing organ is the 
ultimate decision-maker for NGOs on most questions. Its accountability 
is thus pivotal in evaluating the accountability of the organization, and 
the governing organ is, above all, accountable to the constituency em-
powered to compose it. 
Of course, other constituencies may make or affect important decisions 
for NGOs. Managers and front-line staff make many day-to-day deci-
sions about how to execute an NGO’s purposes and programs. In some 
forms of organization, members have the right to approve or veto major 
decisions, and additional rights can be guaranteed to them at the NGO’s 
election. Donors may restrict the funds they contribute to certain uses, 
thereby significantly influencing an NGO’s programmatic decisions. 
Partner organizations may induce an NGO to move in a particular direc-
tion, in order to gain the advantages of affiliation and collaboration—a 
point that Part III explores in further detail, when considering the com-
plementary role NSRs can play in enforcing NGO accountability. Bene-
ficiaries, clients, and even the public may influence an NGO’s actions. 
Nonprofit law requirements for NGOs’ internal governance, however, 
primarily concentrate on composing and regulating governing organs. 
Under various domestic regimes, governing organs may be composed 
in one of three ways: through election, self-perpetuation, or authorization 
of some outside appointing authority. Elected governing organs are 
elected by some constituency of an NGO. Self-perpetuating governing 
organs may originally be composed through selection by a donor or a 
founder. Once vacancies arise, however, the self-perpetuating organ it-
self selects new members. In the third case, an individual or an entity 
outside the formal confines of the NGO selects members of the govern-
ing organ, either in certain situations or always. 
                                                                                                             
veloping countries in which they operate. The legal impacts of the law of these jurisdic-
tions are in part addressed by other papers in this Symposium. 
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These governance structures provide for internal enforcement of ac-
countability within an NGO, but are often quite weak. For example, U.S. 
law requires NGOs forming as nonprofit corporations to seat a board of 
directors, but NGOs may choose to make this governing organ either 
elected or self-perpetuating.75 Self-perpetuating boards, however, are the 
default.76 Directors in a self-perpetuating nonprofit corporate board are 
bound by their fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty in all of their di-
rectorial actions, including nominating and selecting replacement direc-
tors. 77 These decisions, however, are virtually unreviewable.78 Alterna-
tively, an NGO may form as a U.S. nonprofit corporation and expressly 
opt to create a voting membership empowered to vote for directors.79 The 
level of accountability enforcement by a voting membership depends on 
how it is constituted. When institutional membership is used to connect 
nonprofits in a system or federation,80 a voting membership structure is 
                                                                                                             
 75. See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.04 (allowing for an alternative “method of election” or 
appointment). 
 76. See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.04(b). 
 77. See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.30(a); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS § 300 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS] (identifying nonprofit fiduciaries’ duties of care and 
loyalty). 
 78. Only gross negligence or naked self-interest infecting the nomination and ap-
pointment process would likely disturb these personnel decisions. See Michael W. Pere-
grine & James R. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule and Other Protections for the 
Conduct of Not-for-Profit Directors, 33 J. HEALTH L. 455, 456 (2000). Standing to chal-
lenge them is limited. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce 
the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 657–58 (1998). 
 79. The NGO must draft bylaws identifying the criteria by which membership will be 
determined. See, e.g., RMNCA § 6.01. Members may be individual natural persons or 
institutions. See, e.g., RMNCA §1.40 (21), (25). 
 80. For example, a voting membership structure may be used to make a parent non-
profit the sole member of a subsidiary nonprofit or nonprofits, consolidating the parent’s 
authority and empowering it to appoint the subsidiary’s board. See Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the Duties of Parent Corporations Acting as 
Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health Care Systems, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 979, 
988–94 (2001) (describing this structure); see also Robert P. Borsody, Parent-Subsidiary 
Relationship of Not-for-Profit Corporations Raises Official Oversight Issues, N.Y. ST. 
BAR J. 20, 20 (2004) (similarly describing this structure). Alternatively, national, region-
al, or local chapters of a nonprofit might be made institutional members of an interna-
tional umbrella nonprofit, providing them with a means to voice concerns and impact the 
umbrella organization’s policy choices. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Bylaws of Unit-
ed Way Worldwide, approved May 13, 2009, available at http://liveunited.org/page/-
/UWWbylaws_Approved-2009.pdf (providing for institutional members that elect the 
entity’s governing organ). 
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more likely to be a significant force in maintaining the NGO’s accounta-
bility. 
In contrast, if an NGO empowers natural persons as voting members, it 
usually designates nominal financial or voluntary labor contributions as 
membership criteria. Concerned members could expend resources inves-
tigating how an NGO’s board is pursuing and evolving organizational 
mission, following the strictures of organizational form, and stewarding 
the NGO’s resources. If dissatisfied, these same members could turn out 
or threaten to turn out a board of directors as a result of its failures. In 
return for a member’s efforts in monitoring and governing an NGO, she 
receives only the psychic benefits of seeing the NGO make some head-
way towards its goals. For a rational member to expend the real re-
sources of time and money in obtaining and digesting information need-
ed to diagnose potential accountability failures and advocating for organ-
izational change informally or through a formal director election or re-
moval process, this benefit would have to be substantial.81 Rational apa-
thy makes it unlikely that individual members will play an active role in 
policing and disciplining the board. 
Furthermore, individual members are also subject to serious and sub-
stantial collective action problems. A single member’s action is likely 
ineffective; she must motivate her fellow members to join her to effect a 
real difference on the board. A member must be well-resourced, extreme-
ly committed, charismatic, and perhaps lucky to make this work. Defect-
ing to another organization that is better managed or more closely 
aligned with the member’s vision of the good, or settling for somewhat 
less than optimal accountability are both likely more attractive courses, 
as is free-ridership. Although members may also be empowered to pur-
sue accountability of their directors through litigation, this route imposes 
even greater costs. In the U.S. context, members simply cannot be relied 
upon to take the initiative in policing accountability—even if the organi-
zational structure provides for members. It must always be borne in mind 
that in the U.S., an elected board is the exception, not the rule. In other 
jurisdictions, for NGOs structured as organizations with a required vot-
ing membership, perhaps members could play a more consistent monitor-
ing and enforcing role.82 
The governing organ of a charitable trust, a single trustee or group of 
trustees, also may be empowered to self-perpetuate. The charitable trust 
                                                                                                             
 81. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Inter-
nally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829, 859–62 (2003). 
 82. For a discussion of European NGO form, see supra notes 88–94 and accompany-
ing text. 
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form is available to NGOs that are organized in the U.S., United King-
dom, and other common law jurisdictions.83 In the U.S., the trust form is 
more commonly used by grant-making, rather than operating charities,84 
but NGOs organized primarily to disburse funds to service-providers in 
international settings may well take this form.85 The document creating a 
charitable trust will often name the initial trustee or trustees and provide 
a line of succession, process for filling vacancies, or both. If the trust 
document empowers incumbent trustees to name their successors, inter-
nal governance adds little to the enforcement of NGO accountability. 
That said, when planned techniques for filling trustee roles run out or 
fail, courts are empowered to select new trustees for charitable trusts.86 
The outside chance that a government official may, at some future time, 
appoint new trustees is likewise unlikely to be a powerful force in en-
forcing NGO accountability. 
The two main nonprofit forms of organization for NGOs in European 
nations with a civil law tradition differ primarily along the fault lines of 
internal governance structure. NGOs organized in these states may utilize 
the association or the foundation form.87 Both contemplate a board of 
directors as a governing organ,88 but in an association, members elect 
directors and make other major decisions for the nonprofit, while in a 
foundation, there are no members.89 The foundation’s founder is empow-
                                                                                                             
 83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 (2007); see also Hubert Picarda, Har-
monizing Nonprofit Law in the European Union: An English Perspective and Digest, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 170, 184 
(Klaus J. Hopt & Thomas von Hippel eds., 2010) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE]; Choosing and Preparing a Governing Document, UK CHARITY COMM’N 
(Apr. 2008),  http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc22.aspx#5 (describ-
ing the charitable trust as one form of organization available to those forming charities). 
 84. See JACK B. SIEGEL, A DESKTOP GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND 
ADVISORS 25 (2006). 
 85. See KERRY O’HALLORAN, CHARITY LAW AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: AN 
INTERNATIONAL STUDY 59–60 (2007). 
 86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 34(2). 
 87. See Klaus J. Hopt, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Some Corporate Gov-
ernance Thoughts from Europe 5 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
125/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1425670. 
 88. This board can go by varying names by jurisdiction; indeed, in some civil law 
countries, dual boards may be an option, with a board of directors and a supervisory 
board. See, e.g., Katrin Deckert, Nonprofit Organizations in France, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 83, at 303–07; Tymen J. Van der Ploeg, Nonprofit 
Organizations in the Netherlands, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra 
note 83, at 245. Still, however many boards there are, boards will be the governing organ 
to consider. See id. at  244. 
 89. Association law actually frequently points to the membership, acting together in a 
general meeting or general assembly, as the ultimate authority for the nonprofit. See 
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ered to select from various options for constituting the board going for-
ward.90 For example, the founder of a German foundation may set the 
number of directors and the process for their appointment, which may 
include self-perpetuation.91 Alternatively, the founder may opt to retain 
power over appointment of board members.92 Notably, in the Nether-
lands, the founder is permitted to empower some group or body to ap-
point members of the board, though this group cannot be made the ulti-
mate authority of the organization, as in an association.93 
Whether the association/foundation distinction makes a real difference 
for the internal enforcement of accountability is debatable. Association 
law frequently points to the membership, acting together in a general 
meeting or general assembly, as the ultimate authority for the nonprofit.94 
In addition, it is the membership who must elect, and can therefore un-
seat, the governing organ. That said, a general meeting made up of natu-
ral persons with only a psychic or nominal connection to the NGO un-
likely operates as a consistent and substantial internal check on account-
ability. Likewise, when a foundation board self-perpetuates, they appear 
accountable only to themselves, and when a founder retains appointment 
power, she may be more likely to enforce accountability, but may do so 
with a decided bias toward her own view of the foundation’s proper 
course or even in her own financial favor. 
Finally, it is important to note that even governing organs that appear 
to be elected may actually be self-perpetuating. This occurs if a nonprofit 
takes a form of organization requiring members to elect the governing 
organ, but in fact defines the directors or others composing the governing 
organ as the only membership constituency.95 When the members then 
                                                                                                             
Thomas von Hippel, Nonprofit Organizations in Germany, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 83, at 214 [hereinafter Thomas von Hippel, Nonprofits in Ger-
many]. As the general meeting is hardly ongoing, though, the board will be the place 
where the practical “buck stops” for most decisions. 
 90. These options vary by jurisdiction, but all states require the selected option to be 
clearly stated in the foundation’s constitution or charter. See, e.g., id. at 215; Kateřina 
Ronovská, Nonprofit Organizations in the Czech Republic, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 83, at 402. 
 91. See Thomas von Hippel, Nonprofits in Germany, supra note 89, at 215. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Van der Ploeg, supra note 88, at 234. 
 94. See Thomas von Hippel, Nonprofits in Germany, supra note 89, at 214. 
 95. See MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 159 
(2004); see also Greyham Dawes, Charity Commission Regulation of the Charity Sector 
in England and Wales, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 83, at 890 
(noting this situation in “many charitable companies”). 
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vote for directors, they vote in their membership capacity, but in fact 
vote for themselves or their own successors. 
Across these organizational forms, internal governance structures 
speak to the question of accountability of a governing organ. None of 
them, however, provide for very strong internal enforcement of NGO 
accountability. The next Section considers the additional accountability 
enforcement provided by various external actors in the domestic context. 
B. External Enforcement of NGO Accountability under Domestic Non-
profit Law 
Various external actors are also empowered to enforce NGO accounta-
bility under domestic nonprofit law. Domestic nonprofit law focuses on 
how an NGO’s governing organ is pursuing its mission,96 whether it is 
doing so by efficiently deploying its assets and resources, and if it is a 
legitimately and effectively managed organization.97 These responsibili-
ties are fundamental to running a legitimate and successful NGO.98 They 
also can be traced to a variety of legal doctrines and requirements. Yet, 
the ability of external actors to enforce these expectations of governing 
organs varies considerably. Mission, financial, and organizational ac-
countability will not be equally enforced by external actors in a single 
jurisdiction, and the strength and focus of nonprofit enforcement also 
may vary across jurisdictions. This Subpart takes the U.S. as its primary 
example, explaining how external regulators variably enforce these dif-
ferent elements of NGOs’ obligations. 
1. Mission Accountability 
The ultimate responsibility of nonprofits and their leaders is to achieve 
their missions. As an obligation to an abstract ideal, rather than a set of 
particular individuals, though, mission accountability is difficult to track 
and enforce. To do so, one first needs to know how and where a nonprof-
it’s mission is articulated. Nonprofit law can be of some assistance here, 
as it generally requires the formulation of a statement of purpose in the 
organization’s formative documents.99 This purpose statement, however, 
                                                                                                             
 96. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 
2 (2011) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials]; see also Greaney & 
Boozang, supra note 67, at 80–87 (articulating a view of nonprofit law based on “mission 
primacy”). 
 97. See Brakman Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 71, at 209–10. 
 98. See BROWN & JAGADANANDA, supra note 47, at 5–6, 9, 39. 
 99. See, e.g., RMNCA § 2.02(b)(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 27, 28; 
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 323 (3d ed. 2000). 
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may be quite general, such as an organization formed for “religious” or 
“educational” purposes. When little is documented, the mission of a non-
profit is articulated over time, as the nonprofit makes statements to do-
nors, regulators, beneficiaries, and the public, and as it undertakes pro-
grams and activities that speak to its purposes.100 In the NGO context, 
consider a nonprofit incorporated in the U.S., formed to secure a fair, 
safe, and sustainable future for consumers. The purpose clause in its arti-
cles might state that it is formed to “protect consumers from deceptive 
practices.” This purpose clause is narrower than the mission described 
above, but is far from unambiguous. Governing organ approved appeals 
to donors, describing its work as focused on deceptive and fraudulent 
practices in the U.S. food industry, provides further clarification. 
The task of tracking mission accountability is made even more difficult 
by the fact that the missions of nonprofits, including NGOs, can legiti-
mately evolve over time. These entities are often given perpetual life, 
among other benefits, in return for the perceived good they generate for 
society. So, nonprofits must continue to change over time to better ad-
dress the issues they were formed to resolve, or move on to new issues as 
times and circumstances change to make them more salient. This ability 
to change course and innovate is, in fact, one of the strengths of the non-
profit sector.101 Recall our consumer protection NGO. Perhaps it begins 
its work in the U.S. food industry, focusing its efforts there for fifteen 
years. If it is successful with these efforts, the NGO’s governing organ 
might consider beginning an advocacy effort to national governments 
and even international organizations, to rid the world of deceptive prac-
tices that defraud consumers. This might be an addition to its work in the 
food industry or in the United States. Alternatively, it might be a com-
plete change of course from exposing fraud to rooting out corruption or 
setting standards. If the governing organ undertakes any of these courses, 
who will evaluate their decision for faithfulness to the nonprofit’s mis-
sion? And, using what baseline? 
These are challenging issues, and unfortunately, the obligations and 
enforcement architecture imposed by domestic nonprofit law is likely to 
                                                                                                             
 100. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 77, at 126 
(describing the gap between mission and purposes). 
 101. See id. at 126 (noting the need for charitable mission to evolve over time); see 
also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 225–26 (asserting that charitable trust fiduciaries 
also have obligations to ensure mission continues to address “contemporaneous needs”). 
See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers: Regulating the Market for 
Mission Control, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1181, 1240–41 and accompanying notes (describing 
the value of nonprofits in providing innovation and transforming to address new issues 
and concerns). 
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be of little assistance. For example, in the U.S., where the key regulators 
are state attorneys general (“AGs”) and the federal Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, public enforcement of mission accountability is likely to be low. 
First, the authority and tools with which these regulators are equipped are 
ill-suited to enforcing mission accountability. State AGs have the closest 
to plenary power to regulate nonprofits organized in their jurisdictions, 
but their mandates generally speak in terms of safeguarding charitable 
assets.102 Further, while AGs typically have at their disposal a wider 
range of enforcement tools, they work primarily through litigation and its 
attendant processes of investigation, along with imposing disclosure re-
quirements, the results of which they have limited resources to mine.103 
Limited legal, financial, and human resources and practical concerns 
about their political futures lead U.S. state AGs to limit their involve-
ment in enforcing mission accountability. They are most likely to raise or 
respond to mission accountability challenges when they become extreme, 
such as when the doctrine of cy pres must be invoked in court to permit 
the change of purpose to which a charitable trust’s assets have been dedi-
cated.104 This doctrine applies by its terms only to assets impressed with 
a charitable trust, though it has been applied to incorporated nonprofits 
looking to change the use of restricted gifts105 and analogically to address 
more general issues of mission change.106 The apocryphal example here 
is a home for abandoned animals morphing into a vivisectionist socie-
                                                                                                             
 102. See Brakman Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 71, at 219–20 & n.49. 
 103. See id. at 227. 
 104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (explaining that a court may apply cy 
pres where property is placed in trust to be applied to a designated charitable purpose and 
it is or becomes unlawful, impossible, or impracticable to carry out that purpose, or to the 
extent it is or becomes wasteful to apply all of the property to the designated purpose); 
see also John Eason, Motive, Duty, And The Management Of Restricted Charitable Gifts, 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV, 123, 128–38 (2010) (explaining current cy pres doctrine as a 
preface to advocating its reform in the context of restricted gifts). 
 105. See, e.g., UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (UPMIFA) § 6(c) 
(applying cy pres concept to restricted funds held by incorporated nonprofits); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. A. See generally Evelyn Brody, From The 
Dead Hand To The Living Dead: The Conundrum Of Charitable Donor Standing, 41 GA. 
L. REV. 1183, 1206–12 (2007) [hereinafter Brody, Dead Hand or Living Dead] (discuss-
ing the confused nature of case law addressing standing and the merits in cases involving 
change of use for restricted gifts to incorporated charities); Eason, supra note 104 (criti-
cizing this maneuver and advocating reform). 
 106. For a review of state court cases using trust law concepts to address mission 
change by nonprofit healthcare corporations, see Greaney & Boozang, supra note 67, at 
54–72. 
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ty.107 Less extreme changes of purpose are unlikely to be targeted by 
AGs, wary of wasting their enforcement resources or engaging in a battle 
with well-heeled nonprofit boosters who may be attractive donors to a 
race for the governorship.108 
Moreover, with any public regulator enforcing mission accountability, 
there are potential overtones of unconstitutional state action. If public 
regulators become overly involved in interpreting and managing the evo-
lution of an NGO’s mission, they might well impose upon the associa-
tional or expressive rights of these organizations. No less troubling, pub-
lic regulators aggressively enforcing mission accountability might direct-
ly, or through a chilling effect, push NGOs to pursue only those courses 
that are in line with some government administration’s views on appro-
priate development, trade, or other policies.109 In some other jurisdic-
tions, domestic nonprofit law provides public regulators a greater role in 
policing mission accountability. For example, the UK Charity Commis-
sion was recently empowered to focus more deeply and closely on the 
purpose and public benefits provided by UK charities.110 After undertak-
ing assessments at a number of charities, the Commission found that sev-
eral did not adequately pursue public benefits and worked with the chari-
ties to restructure their activities to comply with the public benefit re-
quirement.111 Of course, governmental authorities inclined to use non-
profit regulation to further political agendas and dampen opposition 
could also deploy the power to approve and review the purpose of non-
profits to these ends.112 
                                                                                                             
 107. See Attorney General v. Hahnemann Hosp., 397 Mass. 820, 836 n.18 (1986) (hy-
pothesizing such an example in a case regarding change in use of donated funds). 
 108. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism And Paternalism In State Chari-
ty Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946 (2004) (Political cynics believe that “A.G.” 
stands not for “attorney general” but for “aspiring governor.”). 
 109. Shades of such argument have arisen in claims by Z Street, a pro-Israel group that 
is suing the IRS, claiming its exemption application is being delayed to determine the 
alignment of its mission with administration policies in the Middle East. See Grant Wil-
liams, Pro-Israel Group Says IRS Plays Politics, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 6, 2010. 
The IRS declined to comment on the issue, noting only that it must subject applications 
by groups with overseas activities to special review. See id. 
 110. See UK CHARITIES ACT 2006 §§ 1–3 (providing that all UK charities must pursue 
charitable purposes, defined in the statute, and public benefit, on which the Charities 
Commission is directed to issue guidance). 
 111. The Public Benefit Assessment Reports, CHARITY COMM’N (July 2010), 
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/Charity_essential
s/Public_benefit/pbassessreports.aspx. 
 112. See, e.g., Mark Sidel, Maintaining Firm Control: Recent Developments in Non-
profit Law and Regulation in Vietnam, 12 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 52 (2010). Note 
that some critics of the new “public benefit” test applied under the UK Charities Law of 
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Regulators are certainly not the only avenue for external enforcement 
of an NGO’s mission accountability. Private parties, such as donors, em-
ployees, partner organizations, beneficiaries, and citizens more broadly 
may care deeply about the accountability of an NGO to its mission. None 
of these potential groups of private enforcers, however, can effectively 
police NGOs’ mission accountability alone. 
Donors might be especially motivated to police the mission accounta-
bility of NGOs’ governing organs. They have, after all, staked not only 
their hopes, but their fortunes on a recipient NGO’s mission. Perhaps this 
would give them a greater incentive to monitor and enforce mission ac-
countability. For small donors, similar collective action problems to 
those plaguing individual members are likely to limit mission accounta-
bility enforcement. But large, repeat, or institutional donors might over-
come these problems because they are more heavily invested in the 
NGO’s mission and have greater resources to allocate to accountability 
enforcement, or both. Under U.S. law, however, donors are not granted 
significant legal authority to enforce nonprofit accountability, to mission 
or otherwise. Other than what they negotiate by contract, which again 
suggests that large, repeat, or institutional donors are the key players 
here, donors do not have rights to access donee information, or to partic-
ipate in selecting a donee’s governing organ, or standing to sue members 
of that governing organ for fiduciary breach.113 This is not to suggest that 
donors are impotent to impact and monitor NGOs’ mission. In fact, the 
potential for donors’ outsized influence over NGOs is noted in the litera-
ture.114 But this influence is of practical, not legal, origin. Just two of 
many examples of this are when a large donor becomes a board member 
as a result of her donation or when a historically large donor pressures 
directors to pursue her unique vision or risk losing access to anticipated 
future contributions. The role for donors can differ across jurisdictions of 
course; as noted earlier, some European regimes bestow significant legal 
authority on founders of foundations. In the U.S. model, though, donors 
have little, if any, legal authority to enforce mission accountability. 
                                                                                                             
2006 worry that this test might be just so inappropriately used. See, e.g., Picarda, supra 
note 83, at 180–81. 
 113. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 324–42 (2004) (noting general restrictions 
on standing outside of the attorney general, but sometimes successful suits by donors 
alleging breaches of gift terms); see also Brody, Dead Hand or Living Dead, supra note 
105, at 1187–88. 
 114. See, e.g., L. David Brown & Mark H. Moore, Accountability, Strategy, and Inter-
national Nongovernmental Organizations, 30 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 569, 
576 (2001) (noting that “[d]ependence for financial support on contributors creates some 
important accountability dilemmas for INGOs”). 
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Likewise, while the legal enforcement resources of employees and 
partner organizations are extremely limited, their practical influence can 
be significant, even problematically so. For example, the executive direc-
tor and other top level managers of a nonprofit often provide the govern-
ing organ with its only source of information on the problems it seeks to 
ameliorate, the progress of the organization on the ground, the activities 
of other organizations in the field, etc. In addition, powerful nonprofit 
CEOs often research and suggest candidates for the governing body.115 
This power to manage the information a governing organ receives as 
well as its personnel can give high level employees significant power to 
frame a governing organ’s agenda and influence its decisions. The power 
of staff can be so overwhelming as to up-end the conceptual ideal of the 
governing organ as a nonprofit’s ultimate decision-maker.116 These are 
serious problems that should not be underestimated and should be target-
ed, but they are not based on employees’ legal authority. In fact, the only 
authority that employees may have to influence a nonprofit’s governing 
organ under U.S. law is access to the rarely granted category of “special 
interest” standing to allege fiduciary breach.117 The legal influence of 
partner organizations is likewise limited, though they may have signifi-
cant practical sway that might be bolstered, as suggested in Part III, in an 
NGO’s boardroom. 
NGOs’ beneficiaries or the average citizen tend to engage in even less 
enforcement of mission accountability. They have occasionally been 
granted special interest standing to challenge actions by a governing or-
gan.118 As noted above, however, the use of this doctrine is very rare. 
Individuals from either group could also choose to fund public regulatory 
                                                                                                             
 115. “[S]trong or long-serving CEOs may gain significant influence in the selection of 
board members, in effect choosing their own bosses.” MICHAEL J. WORTH, NONPROFIT 
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 64 (2009). 
 116. See Evelyn Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, in THE STATE OF 
NONPROFIT AMERICA 471, 486 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) [hereinafter Brody, Ac-
countability and the Public Trust] (citing and quoting Peter Dobkin Hall’s concern about 
“professionalization of nonprofit managers as ‘a sort of Trojan horse’ [] tending to shift 
policymaking from the governing board to the staff”). 
 117. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 328–29 (2004); see also Mary Grace 
Blasko, Curt S. Crossley, & David Lloyd, Standing To Sue In The Charitable Sector, 28 
U.S.F. L. REV. 37 61–78 (1993) (describing the elements courts consider in granting or 
denying special interest standing). 
 118. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 329–34 (reviewing various cases, though 
noting the greater number of cases where claims were denied for lack of standing). 
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action as a relator119 in those states where this status is available.120 Of 
course, they could attempt to influence an NGO by informal or media 
pressure. But these groups suffer even more acutely the same collective 
action problems described with respect to members and donors above. 
Aside from the lack of legal enforcement tools and practical resources 
needed for private external enforcers to police nonprofit mission ac-
countability under U.S. law, each identified group suffers from a more 
fundamental problem in playing this role: bias. Donors, employees, part-
ner organizations, beneficiaries, and the public (as well as members, 
where they exist) are all potentially legitimate stakeholders of an NGO. 
In order to responsibly steward its mission, a nonprofit’s governing or-
gan must consider and balance the concerns of its various constituencies, 
rather than favoring the desires of one individual or group.121 This prob-
lem is not unique to the U.S. legal system, and is fundamental to creating 
a real response to mission accountability. 
Thus, for an NGO to be truly accountable to mission, it must provide 
for a dialogue on that mission among an array of stakeholders. This dia-
logue is important in making various levels of decisions for the NGO, 
but is most vital if considering mission change. As noted earlier, non-
profits are deemed deserving of many of the special benefits they receive 
in large part because they can evolve over time to address changing 
needs. So, mission can and should legitimately be transformed over time. 
To transform mission legitimately, an NGO must activate the internal 
governance structures supplied by its organizational form, as well as oth-
er means, to enable a dialogue among stakeholders.122 Looking to only 
one set of important NGO constituencies to make these decisions, just as 
looking to it to enforce mission accountability, is inherently biased and 
insufficient. 
To summarize, mission accountability is fundamental to an NGO’s le-
gitimacy as an entity, but domestic nonprofit law provides relatively little 
content and external enforcement of this vital attribute. In the U.S., rela-
tively weak public enforcement is, in part, an unintended consequence of 
the shape of regulators’ authority and, in part, a deliberate attempt to 
separate the government and the nonprofit sector for constitutional and 
policy reasons. Some other nations are more willing to address mission 
accountability directly, but still cannot fully enforce mission accountabil-
                                                                                                             
 119. See id. at 325 (explaining that a relator is a member of the public who may be 
“authorized by the attorney general to bring [] suit” to enforce the obligations of a charity 
or its fiduciaries). 
 120. See id.; Blasko et al., supra note 117, at 49–50. 
 121. See Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, supra note 96, at 11. 
 122. See id. 
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ity in a vibrant nonprofit sector. Monitoring mission at every turn would 
require regulators to devote vast resources and would diminish NGOs’ 
ability to innovate in a sphere separate from government influence.123 
Some governments might effectively constrain deviation from mission 
by carving out only an extremely narrow space for NGOs to operate. 
This approach, however, undermines the ability of these organizations to 
achieve development, human rights, and harmonization goals. Further-
more, as just one stakeholder, regulators cannot be the sole voice in judg-
ing mission accountability. 
Private enforcers are likewise unequipped by nonprofit law to police 
mission accountability from the outside. Many important nonprofit con-
stituencies lack legal authority over an NGO’s governing organ, suffer 
severe collective action problems, or both. Finally, again, a single em-
powered stakeholder group can never be a complete solution; authorizing 
any group to demand priority in accountability necessarily undermines 
other constituencies. A dialogue among stakeholders is necessary. 
2. Organizational Accountability 
The dialogue over mission accountability is partly structured by refer-
ence to the governance architecture an organizational form puts in place. 
Governance arrangements, of course, do more than provide a means to 
mission accountability. They are also instruments useful for maintaining 
financial accountability.124 Moreover, close observation of governance 
structures has inherent value, by reinforcing an NGO’s position as a le-
gitimate organization, not merely some personal fiefdom of a donor or 
leader. Organizational accountability measures how fully an NGO utiliz-
es its governance and operational structures and is of particular im-
portance to NGOs seeking legitimacy as actors or representatives on the 
world stage. 
Domestic nonprofit law provides significant guidance here. As dis-
cussed above, each organizational form offered to nonprofit organiza-
tions by a particular jurisdiction puts in place default structures for gov-
ernance. For example, in the U.S., an incorporated NGO must have a 
board of directors, though it may and likely will be self-perpetuating.125 
The board must hold meetings composed of a quorum and vote on its 
                                                                                                             
 123. Cf., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-For-Service Charity 
And The Limits Of Autonomy 18–20 (Notre Dame L. Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 10–21, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1666421 (describing the importance 
of charitable autonomy to performing its valuable roles in the economy and society). 
 124. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 125. See, e.g., RMNCA §§ 6.03, 8.04. 
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decisions.126 In their votes as in all other directorial actions, directors are 
bound by their fiduciary obligations.127 Boards are also authorized to 
form committees, and to delegate certain matters to them.128 In an NGO 
formed using one of the European associational forms, general meetings 
of members must be held, and certain decisions, including director elec-
tions, are made by these members.129 
Of course, there are numerous rules and proposals that would make 
these structures more demanding. A few U.S. jurisdictions impose not 
only the requirement of a board for incorporated nonprofits, but that a 
majority of the directors serving on that board be “independent.”130 A 
U.S. Senate committee’s staff recently proposed capping the number of 
directors, and commentators and best practice guides cite the need for an 
independent board of a workable size.131 Critics also argue against con-
trol of a nonprofit by a single-member governing organ.132 Several schol-
ars warn against borrowing of fiduciary standards from the for-profit 
realm for nonprofit directors, regardless of whether those directors are 
independent. In one recent example, Professor Leslie argues that a non-
profit director should be allowed to deal with her organization only when 
the deal she provides is better, and not just equal, to what the nonprofit 
could obtain on the open market.133 Some regulators press for greater 
                                                                                                             
 126. See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.24. 
 127. See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.30. 
 128. See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.25. 
 129. See, e.g., Van der Ploeg, Nonprofit organizations in the Netherlands, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 83 at 244–45. 
 130. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 13-B, § 713A(2) (2005) (allowing only forty-
nine percent of a public benefit corporation’s board to be “financially interested per-
sons”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292:6a (requiring a minimum of a five-member board, 
none of which are related to each other); RMNCA § 8.13 (optional section, similar to 
Maine’s). For critiques of the independent director imperative, see Kathleen Boozang, 
Does An Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate Governance?, 75 TENN. L. 
REV. 83 (2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795 (2007). 
 131. STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 108TH CONG., STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT 13, available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062204stfdis.pdf.; PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS  75–77  (2005) [hereinafter PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR]. 
 132. See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 131, at 75–77; see also Evelyn 
Brody, Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law Got To Do With It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 641, 672 (noting that “single-director and single-trusteed charities seem to invite 
failures of proper independence and protection of the public interest”). 
 133. Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom Of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Govern-
ance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1224 (2010). 
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disclosure by nonprofits.134 There is certainly room to argue about the 
proper content of governance requirements imposed on nonprofits. In-
deed, the simple diversity of structures and standards applied across 
forms and jurisdictions suggests the variety of opinions on this matter, or 
perhaps the idea that the sector is too heterogeneous for a single form. 
That debate is beyond the scope of this Article. For present purposes, the 
fact remains that domestic nonprofit law has much to say about how an 
NGO should be governed and operated, and these organizations can and 
should be judged by their fidelity to those rules and standards. 
This judgment may take place, however, only to a limited degree. 
Again, external enforcement is the key question, and enforcement of or-
ganizational accountability on its own is often limited. Consider again 
the U.S. example where public regulators have the authority to police 
organizational accountability. If an NGO’s governing organ does not 
follow the structures of governance provided by state law, state AGs may 
sue for failure to obey the law, for breach of the fiduciary duty of care, or 
both.135 Of course, state AGs have inadequate resources to pursue every 
nonprofit accountability lapse.136 AGs must prioritize and do so in cases 
where failures to follow governance requirements leads to misuse of 
nonprofit funds or misleading donors. Remedying gaps in governance 
alone is like preventive medicine—important in the long run, but diffi-
cult to devote scant resources to in the short run. A few state AGs have 
taken laudable steps to train members of the nonprofit sector about the 
need for governance and other operational controls.137 Still, public en-
forcement action for failure to observe these controls is rare when no 
charitable funds have been lost or donors disappointed.138 The recent 
governance initiative by federal tax regulators could be a step in the di-
                                                                                                             
 134. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus 
of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 568–80 
(2005) (reviewing disclosure focus of post-Sarbanes-Oxley nonprofit reform proposals). 
 135. See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.30. 
 136. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 352 (noting this lack of resources and 
collecting sources); see also Brody, Accountability and the Public Trust, supra note 116, 
at 479 (similarly noting this lack of resources and collecting sources); Lloyd Hitoshi 
Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the 21st Century, 85 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 479, 494–95 (describing lack of resources and other factors that motivate under-
enforcement of charity governance regulations). 
 137. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 448. 
 138. See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 
1440–42 (1998) (asserting that AGs infrequently prosecute lapses of care in cases without 
simultaneous lapses of loyalty). 
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rection of more organizational accountability enforcement for its own 
value;139 time will tell. 
Public regulators of other types in different jurisdictions may engage in 
more organizational accountability enforcement. The UK Charity Com-
mission has the authority to remove members of the governing organ, to 
direct application of charity property, and to make inquiries regarding 
whether a nonprofit is meeting the public benefit requirement.140 It also 
engages in substantial guidance, including publication of model docu-
ments, posting of outcomes in regulatory interventions, and answering 
questions for nonprofit fiduciaries and employees.141 The Commission 
often takes a collaborative, rather than adversarial, tone toward its regu-
latory projects.142 All of these efforts could lead to greater pure organiza-
tional accountability enforcement and provide guidance for nonprofit 
leaders on how to self-enforce in this area. Resources, though, remain 
limited. If pressed to choose between undertaking regulatory action 
against a charity whose organizational accountability lapses lead to loss-
es of financial resources or donor confidence, or against a charity with 
disorganized operations but no current lapses in outcomes, even a regula-
                                                                                                             
 139. See James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’ Corporate Governance Initi-
ative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 558–78 (2010) [hereinafter Fishman, Stealth Preemption] 
(describing the various IRS initiatives aimed at improving exempt entities’ corporate 
governance). Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worthy of note that Profes-
sor Fishman subjects this initiative to serious criticism on federalism grounds, and the 
debate over its propriety is ongoing. See id. 
 140. See UK CHARITIES ACT 2006 §§ 2(1), 19–21; Charities and Public Benefit, UK 
CHARITIES COMM’N (Jan. 2008),  
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Charity_requirements_guidance/Charity_essential
s/Public_benefit/public_benefit.aspx#h (describing the Commission’s enforcement of the 
public benefit requirement on new and existing charities); see also Picarda, supra note 
83, at 194; Richard Fries, The Charity Commission for England and Wales in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 83, at 908. 
 141. See Providing Information, Advice and Legal Consent, UK CHARITIES COMM’N, 
http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/About_us/Regulation/Providing_information_inde
x.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (“One of the key ways we [help charities function 
well] is by publishing general resources and guidance for charities, their advisers and the 
public in a variety of different formats.”); see also Fries, supra note 140, at 907–08 (not-
ing the Commission’s role in producing risk assessments, advice, and guidance material). 
 142. See THE CHARITY COMMISSION AND REGULATION, UK CHARITIES COMM’N (Jan. 
2010), available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Library/regstance.pdf (ex-
plaining regulatory approach with substantial emphasis on educating charities and their 
leaders, providing guidance, and assisting them in compliance); Fries, supra note 140, at 
907–08 (describing this advisory approach, but noting “the Commission’s advice has 
considerable authority!”). But see Dawes, supra note 95, at 857 (noting Commission’s 
use of “name and shame” tactics to ensure compliance). 
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tor dedicated to organizational accountability’s preventive value will be 
hard pressed to choose the latter.143 
When it comes to enforcing organizational accountability, private ex-
ternal enforcers again suffer from a lack of resources and authority, as 
well as collective action problems discussed above. There is at least, 
though, significant clarity of the substance of an NGO’s obligations in 
the organizational accountability context, in contrast to the situation in 
mission accountability. If some NGO stakeholders can be activated to 
engage in enforcement here, their enforcement can substitute for that of 
others without the resources, authority, or collective will to do so. Do-
nors, employees, and partner organizations are the most likely groups to 
do so. Beneficiaries and members of the public have little access to in-
formation suggesting governance and operational requirements have 
gone unfulfilled and, even with such information, have little authority to 
challenge such failures. 
Donors, particularly large, repeat, or institutional donors, may under-
stand or be educated to see the importance of organizational accountabil-
ity to achieving mission, financial integrity, and legitimacy on the world 
stage. In the U.S., donors still do not have standing to bring a suit chal-
lenging organizational accountability failures as breaches of the fiduciary 
duty of care.144 If they understand its importance, however, donors could 
add required procedures or milestones by contract, which could create 
enforceable contract obligations for an NGO to be organizationally ac-
countable.145 Practically, too, donors have obvious influence. If donors 
see an NGO failing to follow the governance roles or procedures re-
quired, they can curtail future contributions. Large contributions may 
secure a donor a board seat, which she can then use to ensure these roles 
and procedures are observed. In other jurisdictions, donors may have 
additional legal authority. For example, the founder of a German founda-
tion is permitted to reserve rights in the organization’s formative docu-
ments, allowing him to serve as a director or to appoint or discharge oth-
er directors, which secures additional enforcement authority over organi-
                                                                                                             
 143. See, e.g., Kaye Wiggins, Charity Commission Shelves Public Benefit Assessments 
for Hospitals and Health Charities, THIRD SECTOR (Aug. 31, 2010), 
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traditionally, though not universally, hold that the terms of a restricted gift itself are not 
themselves a matter of contract law). 
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zational as well as other accountability failures.146 Likewise, German 
donors may have contractual rights because gifts can at times be treated 
and remedied as contracts.147 
An NGO’s employees or partner organizations might also police or-
ganizational accountability. In the U.S., these groups generally lack spe-
cial legal authority to challenge an entity’s failure to follow the govern-
ance and operational structures that it has adopted. Yet, employees may 
be best able to perceive such failures and can act informally to pursue 
remedies. For example, an NGO’s CFO would likely be aware if meet-
ings of the Board’s Finance Committee have not been held, and could 
call upon the relevant directors to revive it.148 Partner organizations can 
also have significant practical influence. Consider an NGO pursuing ac-
counting standard setting for developing countries, which partners with 
an NGO pursuing training in using business software for inhabitants of 
those same jurisdictions. The accounting standards NGO could refuse to 
continue the partnership unless the software group provided it with con-
flict of interest disclosures from its board members. Of course, employ-
ees and partnerships will not always be able to see organizational ac-
countability failures or have the clout to demand remediation. It is also 
possible that these groups could be a source of organizational accounta-
bility failures. The NGO CFO described above could block meetings of 
the Finance Committee or fail to provide them with necessary infor-
mation. The accounting standards NGO could encourage the software 
NGO’s executive director to make major commitments without board 
approval. Thus, employees and partners are a potential enforcement re-
source, but standing alone, will not be sufficiently reliable and consistent 
monitors. Their potentially complementary role here is addressed in 
greater detail in Part III. 
Domestic nonprofit law provides significant content regarding what an 
NGO must do to be organizationally accountable. It offers routes for set-
ting up organizations with varying governance structures and roles and 
calls on individual entities to layer on additional content through their 
founding and operating documents.149 Faithfully following these pre-
                                                                                                             
 146. See Thomas von Hippel, Nonprofits in Germany, supra note 89, at 218. 
 147. See id. at 219 (explaining this approach, though noting that claims under it are 
rarely brought). 
 148. See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. 
Supp. 1003, 1015–16 (D.C.D.C. 1974) (failure to hold finance committee meetings was 
one of the fiduciary violations found by the court). 
 149. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an 
Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 635–37 (1985) (discussing laws on nonprofit 
structure and governance); RMNCA §§ 2.05, 2.06, 8.30 (1988). 
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scriptions is necessary for an organization to be able to articulate, track, 
and transform its mission legitimately. Likewise, as discussed below, 
these procedures are useful instruments for tracking, investing, and effec-
tively deploying an NGO’s financial assets.150 Further, when the struc-
tures and processes demanded by domestic nonprofit law provide a legit-
imate process for collecting and representing the views of its various 
stakeholders, following them will have inherent value for an NGO. 
Providing a framework to demonstrate that an NGO is responsive to and 
representative of its relevant constituencies increases its legitimacy as a 
force in global regulation. 
Neither public nor private regulators, however, have the incentives and 
resources to sufficiently enforce domestic law’s organizational accounta-
bility mandates. In the U.S., litigation-focused and resource-constrained 
public regulators focused on preventing fraud and waste of nonprofit re-
sources most often pursue organizational accountability failures when 
linked to these other substantive wrongs. They rarely enforce organiza-
tional accountability as a preventative measure. Jurisdictions with a more 
collaborative public enforcement regime may engage in more training 
and enforcement regarding organizational accountability, but public re-
sources are nowhere sufficient to do this job alone. Private external en-
forcers like large, repeat, or institutional donors will at times contract for 
improvements of organizational accountability, or might be able to se-
cure them through their formal or informal influence over an NGO’s 
governance. Employees and partner organizations may make similar con-
tributions, though not reliably and consistently. In fact, the problem of 
employee-capture in the nonprofit sector raises serious questions about 
the benefit of their influence here. Perhaps NGOs’ global regulatory 
partners can complement the partial enforcement likely in the domestic 
nonprofit law context, a point to which we shall return in Part III. Doing 
so is key to preserving the legitimacy of NGOs as nonprofits and as par-
ticipants in global regulation. 
3. Financial Accountability 
The final aspect of NGO accountability to be addressed here, financial 
accountability, is the strain on which domestic nonprofit law concen-
trates most of its attention.151 Financial accountability looks to how an 
NGO handles its resources. An NGO must deploy its assets responsibly 
to achieve its mission, spending efficiently and for optimal impact, as 
                                                                                                             
 150. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 151. See Brakman Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 71, at 207. 
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well as avoiding conferral of private benefits and diversion of assets.152 It 
must develop financial resources effectively, soliciting donors genuinely, 
keeping its promises to them, and investing those assets it holds for fu-
ture use in a portfolio designed to achieve appropriate income and 
growth goals over time. 
The common and statutory law addressing organizational forms, as 
well as charitable solicitation and tax law, are replete with rules address-
ing the deployment, development, and investment of NGO assets. Again, 
looking to the U.S. example, trust and corporate law clearly place obliga-
tions on NGO fiduciaries, inter alia, to avoid unfair self-dealing153 and to 
prudently invest assets.154 In addition to the annual reports that nonprofits 
must submit to state AGs, state regulation of charitable solicitations al-
most always requires reporting on NGOs’ assets and disbursements.155 
U.S. federal tax law imposes various penalties for an exempt NGO’s 
payment of excessive benefits to its leaders, major donors, or their rela-
tives156 and limits an exempt NGO’s ability to dedicate its funds to unre-
lated business activities.157 It is impossible to generalize domestic non-
profit law across jurisdictions; however, the law regarding nonprofit 
forms elsewhere also requires care when NGO leaders manage their or-
ganizations’ finances and often precludes or limits transactions between 
them.158 Charitable solicitation may be publicly- or self-regulated,159 and 
                                                                                                             
 152. A nonprofit director or officer is held to a duty of care which includes avoiding 
“[f]raud, self dealing, misappropriation of corporate opportunities, improper diversions of 
corporate assets, and similar matters . . . .” Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties 
of Nonprofit Directors and Officers, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 646 (1998); see also Brakman 
Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 71, at 216–17. 
 153. See, e.g., RMNCA § 8.31; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 77, § 330 (outlining conflict-of-interest transactions subject 
to good faith board approval). 
 154. See, e.g., UPMIFA § 3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77; PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 77, § 335. 
 155. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 315–17 (describing the breadth of laws 
requiring registration and financial reporting to attorneys general, as well as additional 
financial reports required to be made by those entities engaged in charitable solicitation); 
see also Brakman Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 71, at 235–37 & nn.97–104 (collecting 
statutory citations on charitable solicitor reporting requirements). 
 156. See I.R.C. § 4958; see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 252–64 (reviewing 
I.R.C. restrictions on excess benefit transactions). 
 157. See I.R.C. §§ 511–13; see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 95, at 289–95 (re-
viewing federal taxation of unrelated business income). 
 158. See THE EUROPEAN FOUNDATION: A NEW LEGAL APPROACH 91 (Klaus J. Hopt, W. 
Rainer Walz, Thomas Von Hippel, & Volker Then eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE 
EUROPEAN FOUNDATION] (describing duties of foundation governing organ members 
under the law of various European jurisdictions and finding “[t]he duty of care and (to a 
lesser extent) the duty of loyalty are recognized in all countries . . . .”). 
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compensation and unrelated business activity may or may not be restrict-
ed.160 
In addition to setting strong financial accountability norms, domestic 
nonprofit law tends to focus its public enforcement resources in the fi-
nancial area. Disclosure requirements focus on what is reportable and 
comparable across organizations, which often comes down to financial 
data. In the U.S, public regulators also emphasize financial accountabil-
ity for various other reasons. The mandates of state AGs, as noted above, 
generally speak in terms of safeguarding charitable assets and donors, 
rather than more generally to steward the health and reputation of the 
nonprofit sector. When they seek remedies through litigation, they sue 
fiduciaries whose failures of care, loyalty, or both, have drained the non-
profit’s assets, which the damages obtained through the litigation will 
repay.161 Their litigation skills bias them toward enforcing financial fail-
ures.162 Moreover, nothing plays in the press like a charity leader “steal-
ing from orphans” and elected AGs, perhaps with their eyes on higher 
office, understandably will prioritize such splashy enforcement efforts. 
Tax regulators are focused on remedying tax abuses, and the infor-
mation and concerns they have will therefore often emphasize financial 
elements of an NGO’s activity. Tax authorities police NGO accountabil-
ity in order to avoid abuses of tax exemption, where entities or individu-
als obtaining tax benefits are, in fact, unworthy of them. Such abuses 
could occur because an NGO offers excessively beneficial financial 
                                                                                                             
 159. See, e.g., CHARITIES AND FUNDRAISING, UK CHARITIES COMM’N 20–24 (June 
2010), available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/Publications/cc20.aspx (ex-
plaining the limited role of the Commission in regulating charitable solicitation, relying 
instead on self-regulation); Rene Bekkers, Trust, Accreditation and Philanthropy in the 
Netherlands, 32 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 596, 600–02 (2003) (describing 
self-regulation of charitable solicitation in the Netherlands); See generally Peter Luxton, 
The Regulation of Fund-Raising by Charities and Voluntary Organizations in England 
and Wales, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 83, at 637–61 (ana-
lyzing England and Wales systems); Wino J.M. Van Veen, Comparing Regulation of 
Fundraising: Self-Regulation or Governmental Regulation?, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 83 (analyzing UK and Netherlands systems and 
comparing them with that of the U.S.). 
 160. See THE EUROPEAN FOUNDATION, supra note 158, at 146–48 (comparing Europe-
an positions on renumeration of foundation directors); see also Thomas von Hippel, Non-
profits in Germany, supra note 89, at 222–24 (addressing German restrictions on unrelat-
ed business activity); Zoltán Csehi, Nonprofit Organizations in Hungary, in 
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 83, 374–75 (addressing the Hungar-
ian approach to restrictions on unrelated business activity). 
 161. Of course, other remedies such as structural changes can and do happen, but are 
unlikely without the catalyst of financial losses to spur an AG enforcement action. 
 162. See Brakman Reiser, Enron.org, supra note 71, at 221–22. 
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transactions to its insiders, thereby skimming off funds that could be 
used for pursuit of its mission.163 They may also occur if an NGO pro-
vides benefits to donors in return for their “contributions,” the cost of 
which donors attempt to deduct when calculating their individual income 
tax liability.164 In each case, policing a potential tax abuse will also show 
failures in how an NGO attends to its financial responsibilities. Of 
course, tax enforcement is not always perfectly aligned with policing 
financial accountability, but many tax enforcement priorities will simul-
taneously address an NGO’s financial failures. 
There are also significant incentives for private parties to enforce 
NGOs’ financial accountability. Donors are understandably incensed by 
siphoning or waste of an NGO’s assets, as they may see those lost assets 
as precisely the funds that they donated. Likewise, employees and part-
ner organizations should worry about failures of financial accountability, 
as these failures can threaten the existence of the NGO and thereby their 
positions and partnerships. Beneficiaries and the public in general also 
can easily understand the impact of financial losses to an NGO. For all of 
these parties, too, financial accountability failures can be relatively 
transparent from the disclosures that nonprofits must make to regulators, 
which in the U.S. are publicly available.165 Information suggesting fail-
ures of mission or organizational accountability, while extremely serious 
and dangerous to an NGO’s success and survival, are less easily accessi-
ble and comprehensible even by sophisticated private external regulators. 
For all of these reasons, financial accountability is the focus of external 
enforcement, though it still may not be optimally policed under domestic 
nonprofit law. Public regulators, despite their emphasis on financial is-
sues, are chronically under-resourced and understaffed.166 As such, not 
nearly every failure will be investigated or litigated. Donors, employees, 
and partner organizations have informal access to remedy these failures, 
and can make significant gains in this area. In the U.S., though, donors 
have only limited legal authority. Although donors do not have broad 
standing rights to police nonprofit fiduciaries, they are occasionally 
granted standing to challenge the misapplication of funds contributed to a 
                                                                                                             
 163. See I.R.C. § 4958 (imposing penalty taxes on nonprofit insiders engaged in excess 
benefit transactions). 
 164. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8) (imposing substantiation requirements for deductible chari-
table contributions). 
 165. See GUIDESTAR, www.guidestar.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (providing a 
searchable database of information on over 1.8 million U.S. nonprofits). 
 166. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (addressing lack of resources in AG 
offices). 
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charitable trust or as part of a restricted gift.167 Employees may be pro-
tected by whistle-blowing statutes if they take their concerns to regula-
tors,168 but employees cannot take legal action on their own. Beneficiar-
ies and the public lack even these enforcement resources, and, as dis-
cussed above, each of these external stakeholder groups will rarely have 
standing to mount a generic challenge to an NGO’s financial practices. 
Financial accountability is crucial for NGOs. To be effective, they will 
need funds to dedicate to their purpose now and in the future. A sham 
organization funneling donated funds to its leaders cannot make any le-
gitimate claim to represent a cause or a set of beneficiaries. Domestic 
nonprofit law is an important tool for maintaining and improving this 
vital aspect of NGO accountability. Public external regulators can be 
counted upon to dedicate their, albeit limited, resources here, and other 
external stakeholders also have significant motivation and limited author-
ity to remedy NGOs’ financial failures. Of course, optimal enforcement 
is still only an aspiration. Perhaps international law, norms, and organi-
zations can play a supplementary role in even further improving NGOs’ 
financial accountability. 
*** 
NGOs are organized using a nonprofit legal form recognized by a do-
mestic legal system. This system provides NGOs with an internal gov-
ernance system and external resources for enforcing their accountability. 
However constructed, the internal governance structures tend to provide 
weak accountability enforcement. External enforcement by public regu-
lators and private stakeholders is most effective to police financial ac-
countability, a first step to ensuring an NGO’s viability and thus its abil-
ity to impact international civil society. They provide less robust en-
forcement of organizational accountability, which will often be difficult 
to perceive or seem an unworthy use of limited enforcement resources. 
Mission accountability, though fundamental to an NGO’s legitimacy, 
will rarely be enforced by domestic nonprofit law. Part III considers how 
                                                                                                             
 167. See Brody, Dead Hand or Living Dead, supra note 105, at 1209–22; see also 
UNIFORM TRUST CODE § X (2005) (providing, in its most recent amendment, standing for 
the settler of a charitable trust to “maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust”); Iris J. 
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position, recognizing that “[a]t common law, a donor who has made a completed charita-
ble contribution has no standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of her gift unless 
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 168. See Fishman, Stealth Preemption, supra note 139, at 572 (noting the theoretical, 
but unlikely, application to nonprofit employees of federal whistleblower protections 
enacted under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
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global regulators may complement this predictably limited accountability 
enforcement apparatus. 
III. NGOS AND GLOBAL REGULATORS 
A. Why NGO Accountability Gaps Matter to Global Regulators 
The gaps in nonprofit mission, organizational, and financial accounta-
bility enforcement by public regulators and private stakeholders affect 
the legitimacy of NGOs as NSRs and as contributors to other regulators 
in global governance. First, mission accountability failures call into ques-
tion an NGO’s ability to pursue normative goals as an NSR and under-
mine the ability of NGO participation to improve the output legitimacy 
of the global regulatory process. Second, organizational accountability 
failures suggest that an NGO may itself have insufficient input legitima-
cy to be a proper site for regulation as an NSR, or an effective way to 
boost the legitimacy of other regulators by contributing to global govern-
ance debates and processes. Lastly, although financial accountability will 
be better enforced at the domestic level as a relative matter, resource 
constraints will often mean that gaps in enforcement remain. Without 
adequate financial accountability, NGOs risk becoming ineffective or 
even sham organizations, which are inadequate to regulate or contribute 
to the work of other global regulators. 
Mission accountability matters to NGO legitimacy in global govern-
ance both where NGOs act as regulators themselves and when they con-
tribute to the efforts of other global regulators. In order for an NGO to 
appropriately undertake regulatory activity in either fashion, regulatory 
activities or contributions should relate to and further the organization’s 
mission. For an NGO involvement to enhance the legitimacy of global 
governance, its mission must align with the global governance goals of 
an international regulator or the international community. Pursuing the 
NGOs’ mission must also further the regulatory project. In many cases, 
these mission goals will align. In the case of an NGO, whose sole activi-
ty is acting as an NSR, evolution of the NGO’s mission to better achieve 
regulatory goals is likely appropriate. For example, Transparency Inter-
national fights global corruption through various initiatives.169 Its work 
might evolve as corruption does. When NGOs contribute to the work of 
other NSRs, mission alignment may also be quite close. For example, 
Consumer International is a federation of consumer groups that seeks to 
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protect consumers.170 It participated in the drafting of the OECD Guide-
lines for Protecting Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive Com-
mercial Practices Across Borders without any concern over a mission 
conflict.171 
There are cases, however, where the goals of an NGO may diverge 
from those of an international regulatory project, or vice versa. For ex-
ample, the Civil Society Mechanism (“CSM”) is a coalition of civil soci-
ety organizations representing NGO constituencies concerned with food 
insecurity.172 While the CSM represents a range of civil society organiza-
tions, the principles espoused by some members of the coalition include 
a moratorium on genetically modified foods,173 the rejection of agricul-
tural intellectual property rights,174 and restrictions on large agricultural 
foreign investment.175 The CSM recently attained the right to facilitate 
NGO consultation and participation in the UN FAO Committee on 
World Food Security (“CFS”).176 The G8 and the G20 have endorsed the 
CFS’ work while at the same time generally promoting trade liberaliza-
tion that would conflict with some of the very principles espoused by 
various food security NGOs.177 In such situations, to remain mission-
                                                                                                             
 170. See About Us, CONSUMERS INT’L, http://www.consumersinternational.org/who-
we-are/about-us (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 171. Org. for Econ. Dev. & Cooperation [OECD], Consumer Dispute Resolution and 
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http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/61/36456184.pdf. 
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Need More of the Same Medicine: Joint Declaration Addressed to Governments on 
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 176. Governance Working Group, Int’l Planning Comm. for Food Sovereignty, Oxfam 
Int’l, & Action Aid Int’l,  Proposal for an International Food Security and Nutrition 
Civil Society Mechanism for Relations with the CFS Committee on World Food 2 (2010), 
available at http://cso4cfs.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/cso-mechanism-zero-draft.pdf. 
 177. See G8, L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security, L’Aquila Food Secu-
rity Initiative (AFSI) 4 (2009), available at   
http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Foo
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accountable, each NGO involved must have a process to consider wheth-
er participation in the international regulatory project is consistent with 
its mission.178 A global regulator also must be able to rely on such a pro-
cess, to identify the mission that the NGO pursues, whether the regula-
tor’s legitimacy strategy in drawing in NGO participants is to gain exper-
tise or to expand the diversity of viewpoints it considers. 
Notably, too, when an NGO contributes to the regulatory projects of 
another NSR, the NGO may need to withstand pressure from the regula-
tory environment in order to stay mission-accountable. For example, De-
fence for Children International (“DCI”) promotes children’s rights179 
and closely aligns itself with the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”).180 Although the DCI supported ILO Convention No. 182 
(1999) on the Worst Forms of Child Labour,181 it felt that the Convention 
was too rigid in the categories of intolerable child labor and failed to em-
phasize a child’s right to development, a tenet that the organization finds 
fundamental.182 Faced with this situation, many outcomes are possible, 
but all require some mechanism for DCI to interrogate, reinforce, and 
potentially transform its mission. Perhaps continued involvement with 
the regulator would align with the NGO’s mission, such as if DCI con-
tinued participation in the ILO to steer it toward a differing vision on 
child labor. Alternatively, an NGO might need to remove itself from the 
regulatory process to best pursue its mission, such as if DCI thought it 
best to turn to one of the ILO’s regulatory competitors to secure a regula-
                                                                                                             
d_Security[1],0.pdf; G20, The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration 6, 24 (2010), available 
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 181. Defence for Children Int’l, Position on Child Labour: A Contribution to Debate 
and Practice 2 (2002), available at 
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 182. Id. 
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tory product more in line with DCI’s goals.183 Yet, another way mission 
conflict might develop is if the ILO broke off its relationship with DCI, 
finding its partnership with DCI no longer matched its regulatory goals. 
None of these paths are clear without DCI’s ability to articulate and un-
derstand its children’s rights mission and to evaluate its alignment with 
the mission of the ILO. 
Of course, an NGO’s stakeholders often differ with respect to the ap-
propriate normative understanding of the group’s mission and its legiti-
mate evolution. This conflict mirrors that among international actors over 
the appropriate normative standards in global governance. In both con-
texts, however, debate and dialogue can help reconcile this conflict. 
Within an NGO, a deliberative and participatory process should be used 
to consider how best to pursue mission and when and how it should be 
altered. The dialogue should include various stakeholders, such as do-
nors, employees, partner organizations, and beneficiaries. When this kind 
of inclusive dialogue is embedded in an NGO’s structure or culture, it 
has created a method to track and enforce mission accountability. Then, 
the NGO can bring its considered and deliberated vision on normative 
matters to the global governance arena. Such mission-accountable NGOs 
can help improve global regulators’ ability to work through normative 
conflict because their vision and contribution has garnered support in 
part through deliberation, debate, and persuasion. In contrast, if an NGO 
departs from or fails to carefully consider and reform its mission, or be-
comes co-opted by its involvement in a regulatory process, it abandons 
the fruit of that deliberation and is able to add much less to the legitima-
cy of global regulation. 
Thus, for NGOs to enhance the legitimacy of global regulation mean-
ingfully, mission accountability matters. Yet, enforcement of domestic 
nonprofit law will not sufficiently guard NGOs’ mission accountability. 
If there is a desire to use NGOs to prop up the legitimacy of global gov-
ernance, global regulators need to address this gap. 
As the discussion of mission accountability already foreshadows, or-
ganizational accountability will also matter in enabling NGOs to improve 
the legitimacy of global governance. As a preliminary matter, organiza-
tional accountability is instrumental. Organizational integrity guards mis-
sion (and financial soundness). Thus, to the extent that mission (and fi-
nancial) accountability matters to the legitimacy of global governance, so 
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will organizational accountability. Moreover, organizational accountabil-
ity matters independently. The integrity of the participants in a global 
governance process matters greatly. If a global governance regulator ba-
ses its claim to legitimacy on the input of a variety of views, the origin of 
those views plays into whether they actually enhance the diversity of 
voices and may also impact whether those views can be trusted. If a 
global governance regulator relies on an NGO that is understood to be 
little more than a front for a single faction that is already represented in 
the governance process, this participation does not add to the perceived 
legitimacy of the international regulation the body creates. In fact, it may 
actually undermine this legitimacy. The 2004 Cardoso Report notes criti-
cisms of just this type when government NGOs, which merely parrot the 
desires of a particular government, are drawn into global governance 
processes.184 
Although domestic laws provide governance structures that can pro-
mote organizational accountability, enforcement of these provisions is 
likely weak. Donors often lack information to identify organizational 
accountability problems, and employees may lack the incentive to do so. 
NGOs’ partners are sometimes able to identify organizational failures, 
but many lack the clout to rectify them.185 Gaps in organizational ac-
countability, however, seriously undermine the ability of NGOs to help 
legitimate global governance. To be legitimate global regulators, NGOs 
operating as NSRs must be held to rigorous organizational accountability 
standards, which international law must find some way to enforce. In 
order for other global governance regulators to utilize NGO participation 
to enhance their own legitimacy, they must guard against inclusion of 
NGOs that lack sufficient organizational accountability. 
Like organizational accountability, financial accountability is im-
portant in understanding NGO participation in global governance for in-
strumental and inherent reasons. To the extent that failures in financial 
accountability make an NGO incapable or ineffective in achieving its 
mission, this failure will likewise undermine the NGO’s ability to con-
tribute to global governance. But again, financial accountability also im-
pacts the legitimacy of NGOs’ involvement in global governance direct-
ly. The legitimacy of global governance relies vitally on perceptions. 
Thus, corruption or self-dealing within an NGO acting as an NSR or con-
tributing importantly to the work of other regulators can undermine the 
perceived legitimacy of these global governance efforts. This problem of 
                                                                                                             
 184. Cardoso Report, supra note 16, at 7. 
 185. As noted supra Part III.A., global regulators may be one category of NGO part-
ners with sufficient clout to monitor and enforce organizational accountability. 
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perception can arise even if the financial harm resulting from abuses 
would not have been substantial enough to prevent the NGO from 
achieving its mission. 
Domestic regulators and private stakeholders have more powerful tools 
and incentives to enforce financial accountability than the other strands 
discussed here. Thus, domestic law can be a useful tool for global regula-
tors seeking to secure NGOs’ roles in legitimating global governance. 
Due to resource constraints, though, even financial accountability will 
not be fully enforced in the domestic context. To safeguard the contribu-
tions of NGOs to global governance, international regulators and the in-
ternational community may profitably take steps to monitor and enforce 
financial accountability as well. 
B. The Tools Global Regulators Use to Police NGO Accountability 
NGO accountability ensures NGO participation will enhance the legit-
imacy of global governance; but, domestic regulation of NGOs as non-
profits will not sufficiently guard NGO accountability. Thus, it falls to 
global regulators to monitor and enforce the accountability of NGOs with 
whom they interact and upon whom they rely. The techniques for moni-
toring and enforcing NGO accountability will differ, importantly, de-
pending upon whether the NGO is acting as a NSR itself, or if the NGO 
is participating in the process of some other NSR. This Subpart explores 
the range of tools currently in use by global regulators to police NGO 
accountability; the next Subpart addresses how these tools might be en-
hanced. 
When an NGO serves as an NSR, internal governance structures keyed 
to accountability can be placed into the NGO itself, and mechanisms for 
accountability enforcement beyond domestic regulators and stakeholders 
can be devised. Founders of an NSR NGO can consider whether to use a 
self-perpetuating or elected governing organ and may provide for period-
ic mission statement review and revision, standing committees, or inter-
nal financial controls. For example, the ISO develops standards for use 
by businesses and other actors worldwide.186 Its role in devising stand-
ards with such broad adoption makes the ISO an NSR. Its structure and 
organization suggests numerous attempts to safeguard its accountability, 
which in turn bolsters its legitimacy as an NSR. ISO is incorporated as a 
nonprofit in Switzerland187 and has a member-elected governing organ.188 
                                                                                                             
 186. See ISO Standards, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
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2011] NGOS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1053 
Membership is composed of national standard-setting bodies, which to-
gether compose the general assembly, the ISO’s ultimate authority.189 
Members are themselves often nonprofit organizations in their own ju-
risdictions, and they are entitled to vote on the ISO’s 5-year strategic 
plan, and positions on the executive Council rotate among them.190 The 
ISO also has adopted standing committees on finance and strategy.191 
As internal governance structures will not be self-enforcing and public 
regulators and private stakeholders may insufficiently enforce them, ac-
countability and, thereby, legitimacy of an NGO NSR can be enhanced 
by providing for additional enforcement resources. These might include 
state monitoring, self-regulatory certification,192 the creation of internal 
or external ombudsmen,193 or other mechanisms. For example, Julia 
Black cites Transparency International as an example of a NSR.194 It sets 
standards regarding corruption and then assesses governments using 
those standards. Although it lacks coercive power over governments, its 
power to “name and shame” in effect regulates conduct.195 Transparency 
International is also one of a handful of International NGOs that have 
signed the INGO Accountability Charter, committing them to good gov-
ernance, transparency, and accountability.196 
When NGOs do not operate as NSRs themselves, but rather participate 
in the work of other global governance regulators, NGO accountability 
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29 J. L. & SOC’Y 56 (2002)). 
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countability Charter, supra note 192. 
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still matters, but the routes to accomplishing it are necessarily indirect. 
Since global governance regulators cannot rely on the domestic context 
to comprehensively enforce NGO accountability, they should consider 
creating mechanisms that provide accountability assurances for those 
NGOs that they involve in their regulatory efforts.197 Some NSRs have 
already adopted complex credentialing or accreditation mechanisms to 
pursue this task, though the content of these mechanisms could be im-
proved to more carefully complement domestic enforcement and rein-
force each NSR’s particular legitimacy strategy. Unfortunately, many 
other global governance regulators who rely on NGO participation to 
enhance their legitimacy have not sufficiently attended to accountability 
issues. In these cases, weak application processes admit NGOs to the 
global governance process or no limits are placed on their involvement. 
This Subpart reviews the range of tools NSRs use to monitor and enforce 
the accountability of the NGOs they embrace. 
The United Nations has been at the forefront in establishing NGO ac-
creditation. In 1996, the UN Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”), 
pursuant to its authority under Article 71 of the UN Charter, adopted 
Resolution 1996/31 on the Consultative Relationship between the United 
Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations.198 This Resolution estab-
lishes three types of relationships that NGOs may have with ECOSOC: 
general consultative status, special consultative status, and inclusion on 
the Roster.199 Organizations granted general consultative status have the 
greatest rights to involvement with ECOSOC, including rights to propose 
issues to the Council on their own motion.200 NGOs with general or spe-
cial consultative status may also make written statements to the Council, 
subject to significant requirements of form and, for special consultative 
NGOs, only on the topic of their special competency.201 NGOs on the 
“Roster” receive information about ECOSOC’s activities and may attend 
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meetings, though their involvement is subject to greater Council discre-
tion.202 To obtain any of these relationships with the UN, however, an 
NGO must satisfy some basic criteria. They are worth quoting extensive-
ly here: 
2. The aims and purposes of the organization shall be in conformity 
with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions . . . . 
9. The organization shall be of recognized standing within the particu-
lar field of its competence or of a representative character. Where there 
exist a number of organizations with similar objectives, interests and 
basic views in a given field, they may, for the purposes of consultation 
with the Council, form a joint committee or other body authorized to 
carry on such consultation for the group as a whole. 
10. The organization shall have an established headquarters, with an 
executive officer. It shall have a democratically adopted constitution, a 
copy of which shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, and which shall provide for the determination of policy 
by a conference, congress or other representative body, and for an ex-
ecutive organ responsible to the policy-making body. 
11. The organization shall have authority to speak for its members 
through its authorized representatives. Evidence of this authority shall 
be presented, if requested. 
12. The organization shall have a representative structure and possess 
appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall 
exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exer-
cise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent 
decision-making processes. Any such organization that is not estab-
lished by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement shall 
be considered a non-governmental organization for the purpose of these 
arrangements, including organizations that accept members designated 
by governmental authorities, provided that such membership does not 
interfere with the free expression of views of the organization. 
13. The basic resources of the organization shall be derived in the main 
part from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or 
from individual members. Where voluntary contributions have been re-
ceived, their amounts and donors shall be faithfully revealed to the 
Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. Where, 
however, the above criterion is not fulfilled and an organization is fi-
nanced from other sources, it must explain to the satisfaction of the 
Committee its reasons for not meeting the requirements laid down in 
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this paragraph. Any financial contribution or other support, direct or 
indirect, from a Government to the organization shall be openly de-
clared to the Committee through the Secretary-General and fully rec-
orded in the financial and other records of the organization and shall be 
devoted to purposes in accordance with the aims of the United Nations. 
14. In considering the establishment of consultative relations with a 
non-governmental organization, the Council will take into account 
whether the field of activity of the organization is wholly or mainly 
within the field of a specialized agency, and whether or not it could be 
admitted when it has, or may have, a consultative arrangement with a 
specialized agency.203 
ECOSOC’s accreditation criteria reflect their dual purposes. On one 
level, these criteria seek to determine how well a particular NGO appli-
cant matches with the needs, goals, and ethic of ECOSOC and the United 
Nations. The requirements that UN and NGO mission be aligned, that the 
NGO possesses relevant and useful expertise, and that the NGO be au-
thorized to speak for its members look to justify reliance on the NGO’s 
substantive expertise and most basic bona fides. The criteria considering 
the NGO’s relationship with other UN bodies and allowing NGOs to 
pursue accreditation collaboratively are aimed at making NGO involve-
ment with the UN more efficient. 
In part, for the reasons explained in this Article, the ECOSOC re-
quirements also explore the mission, organizational, and financial ac-
countability of the applicant NGO. Mission accountability is clearly im-
plicated by the consideration of an NGO’s “aims and purposes” and by 
requiring the involvement of a representative body for determination of 
policy.204 The criteria could be read to require applicant NGOs to use an 
organizational form with an elected governing organ, though they only 
specifically mandate that the governing organ remain responsible to 
some “representative body,” and the use of voting or “other appropriate 
democratic and transparent decision-making processes.”205 These ideas 
of responsibility and transparency reflect organizational accountability 
concerns, as do the requirements of a written constitution, headquarters, 
executive officer, and executive organ. Even financial accountability is 
touched on by the criteria, as they require disclosures of sources of sup-
port, with a particular focus on support from government. 
Of course, some of these requirements serve double duty, as the UN is 
concerned about preserving independent and sometimes legitimacy-
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centered goals of its own through many of these requirements. The idea 
of consulting with NGOs is to bring in voices beyond those of the UN 
member states; thus, there is a justifiable concern that government in-
volvement in NGOs will fail to increase the diversity of voices or over-
represent already powerful actors. The lukewarm openness to govern-
ment appointees and extensive demands around government donor dis-
closure reflect this concern. Similarly, the UN’s ethic of representation 
may filter down into its focus on representativeness within consulting 
NGOs. 
As written, the UN ECOSOC accreditation process exemplifies a quite 
comprehensive process currently used by a global governance regulator. 
Notably, however, commentary on these criteria suggests they may not 
be enforced as scrupulously as they are written. The United Nations 2004 
Cardoso Report notes criticisms of the ECOSOC criteria as: driven by 
political concerns; too varied, confusing, and time-consuming; costly; 
fragmented, non-transparent, and non-responsive.206 The Cardoso Report 
also notes the presence of government-sponsored NGOs as a particular 
problem.207 The Cardoso Report makes a proposal for streamlining the 
accreditation process: 
Proposal 19 
The United Nations should realign accreditation with its original pur-
pose namely, it should be an agreement between civil society actors 
and Member States based on the applicants’ expertise, competence and 
skills. To achieve this, and to widen the access of civil society organi-
zations beyond Economic and Social Council forums, Member States 
should agree to merge the current procedures at United Nations Head-
quarters for the Council, the Department of Public Information and 
conferences and their follow-up into a single United Nations accredita-
tion process, with responsibility for accreditation assumed by an exist-
ing committee of the General Assembly.208 
The Cardoso Report also recommends that the Secretariat take addi-
tional steps to “help it with selection and quality assurance” of civil soci-
ety partners.209 In particular, the Report suggests that networks of NGOs 
might provide additional “codes of conduct and self-policing mecha-
nisms to heighten disciplines of quality, governance and balance.”210 In 
its response to the Report’s recommendations, the Secretary General ex-
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pands on these problems, noting that “there are currently large numbers 
of NGOs in consultative status with the United Nations that are not com-
plying with the requirement to submit quadrennial reports on their activi-
ties and how they relate to the overall goals and objectives of the global 
community” and suggests that Member States engage in additional moni-
toring and enforcement.211 The Report also proposes streamlining the 
application process through, inter alia, better use of technology and more 
coordinated efforts among UN bodies and members.212 
Of course, accreditation is only a snapshot and accountability is dy-
namic. The ECOSOC approach to monitoring and enforcement of ongo-
ing NGO accountability relies primarily on disclosure. 
NGOs in general or special consultative status must submit quadrenni-
al reports on their activities to a standing Committee on Nongovernmen-
tal Organizations.213 Focusing little on the internal governance or func-
tioning of the NGO, these reports are required to address “the [NGO’s] 
activities, specifically as regards the support they have given to the work 
of the United Nations.”214 NGOs must provide the Committee with a 
structured disclosure. One field asks NGOs to report their “aims and pur-
poses” and another asks for changes in an “organization’s orientation, 
programme, or scope of work,” which would include amendments to 
foundational documents or changes in funding.215 The disclosure, how-
ever, has much more of a “what have you done for me lately” character. 
Other fields prompt responses regarding NGOs’ work with UN fora, 
bodies, and actions in line with the Millennial Development goals. Based 
on these reports, the Committee may recommend that an NGO’s consul-
tative status or Roster listing be removed,216 though critics argue that this 
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rarely happens217 or has become a disturbingly politicized process.218 For 
example, Peter van den Bossche notes that “between 2000 and 2005 
[there were] . . . five suspensions recommended to the Council by the 
NGO Committee.”219 Thus, ongoing monitoring, while it exists, appears 
to do little to enforce NGO accountability. 
Other UN bodies have similar provisions regarding NGO accredita-
tion.220 The United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”) adopted Arrangements for the Participation of Non-
governmental Organizations in the activities of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development.221 It requires that NGOs shall be rep-
resentative; shall articulate minority views if there are any; shall have an 
executive officer as well as a policy making body; shall be authorized to 
speak for their members; and shall be international and accord their 
members voting rights. Organizations must complete an application 
providing the required information along with a copy of its charter or 
constitution.222 Once authorized through this process to participate as an 
UNCTAD observer, there is no provision for monitoring of the NGO’s 
ongoing compliance with these requirements or removal of its special 
status.223 
The World Health Organization (“WHO”) allows observer NGOs to 
attend meetings, receive non-confidential documentation, and submit 
memoranda. It has regulated its interaction with NGOs through various 
resolutions.224 Resolution WHA40.25, known as the Principles Govern-
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ing Relations between WHO and Nongovernmental Organizations, pro-
vides for “formal” relations between NGOs and the WHO.225 NGOs 
seeking formal relations must not only focus on health, they must be free 
from “concerns which are primarily of a commercial or profit-making 
nature.”226 They should be international and represent a “substantial pro-
portion of the persons globally organized for the purpose of participating 
in the particular field of interest in which it operates.”227 They should 
have a “constitution or other basic document” an established headquar-
ters, a directing or governing body, an administrative structure at various 
levels of action, and authority to speak for members through authorized 
representatives.228 An NGO’s members “shall exercise voting rights in 
relation to its policies or action.”229 In addition, prior to obtaining “offi-
cial relations,” an NGO must have had “working relations”230 status with 
the WHO for two years.231 The process of obtaining official relations 
takes time, typically three to four years.232 In 2004, after a period of 
study of its relations with NGOs, the WHO considered a proposal for a 
new policy to guide its relationship with NGOs.233 The proposal would 
have required more stringent accreditation requirements, but its adoption 
was postponed.234 
The WHO also provides for some monitoring and enforcement of ac-
countability of its participating NGOs over time. NGOs are required to 
submit a “plan for collaboration” with the WHO as the basis for relations 
between it and the WHO.235 The WHO Board of Directors maintains a 
Standing Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations, which reviews 
collaboration with NGOs every three years “and shall determine the de-
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sirability of maintaining official relations.”236 Relations may be discon-
tinued if circumstance warrants or if the NGO no longer meets the requi-
site criteria.237 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is a standard-setting body estab-
lished under the Joint Food Standards Program of the Food and Agricul-
tural Organization of the United Nations and the WHO.238 It sets stand-
ards regarding food safety239 and its norms are widely adopted by 
States.240 It allows NGOs to participate as observers.241 The privileges of 
observer status include being able to attend proceedings, receive docu-
ments, and submit views and written comments. 242 An NGO that already 
has a status with the FAO, or WHO, may obtain status with the Codex 
Commission.243 Other NGOs must be international (in structure and ac-
tivity), representative, concerned with matters falling under the Codex’s 
field of activity, “have a permanent directing body and Secretariat, au-
thorized representatives and systematic procedures and machinery for 
communicating with [their] membership in various countries.”244 They 
must also allow members to express their views either through voting or 
some other mechanism.245 Finally, an NGO must be established for at 
least three years before it can apply to the Codex for observer status. 246 
The Codex does not have specific protocols for review of observer sta-
tus, however, the Director General may terminate observer status any 
time it finds that the NGO no longer meets the requisite criteria.247 Ob-
server status is automatically forfeited if an NGO fails to participate over 
a four year period.248 This provision suggests that there may be NGOs 
who establish observer status without participating in a meaningful way. 
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One could imagine why an NGO might want to claim observer status to 
boost its own legitimacy with various communities, but might not ex-
pend the additional resources to engage in ongoing participation. 
Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) 
have also developed principles for interacting with NGOs, but to date 
they do not have accreditation standards or monitoring or enforcement 
mechanisms in place.249 The IMF Staff Guidelines say very little about 
which NGOs should be part of the IMF outreach, only that the Staff 
should consider a range of factors.250 These factors focus not on the ac-
countability of NGOs themselves, but seek to ensure the appropriateness 
and representativeness of the range of organizations with which the IMF 
works. The IMF and the Bank also host Civil Society Policy Forums to-
gether to facilitate dialogue with civil society on a broad range of top-
ics.251 Civil society organizations must be accredited by the Forum prior 
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to participation, but there are no published criteria on the basis for ac-
creditation. According to the Bank officials, virtually any NGO that ap-
plies is accredited.252 
The WTO, not a UN body, provides for interaction with NGOs in its 
1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
allowing the General Council to make “appropriate arrangements” for 
“[c]onsultations and cooperation” with NGOs. But, as others have docu-
mented, the degree of NGO participation has been modest and this low 
level of NGO involvement is intentional and relatively transparent.253 In 
its Guidelines for Arrangements On Relations with Non-Governmental 
Organizations,254 the WTO calls for interaction with NGOs to be devel-
oped through various means, such as “symposia on specific WTO-related 
issues, informal arrangements to receive the information NGOs may 
wish to make available for consultation by interested delegations and the 
continuation of past practice of responding to requests for general infor-
mation and briefings about the WTO.”255 The WTO has no accreditation 
procedure for NGOs that wish to participate in these events. Indeed, it 
specifically states that NGOs should not work directly with the WTO, 
but rather through their national governments.256 The WTO did issue 
guidelines for more specific NGO engagement in its dialogues, briefings, 
technical seminars, and workshops.257 The organization provides few 
criteria for NGO participation, it notes only that the lunch time briefings 
should be open to NGOs that have published trade-related studies or re-
ports,258 and that outreach should be undertaken to include non-Geneva 
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accreditation standards at both the World Bank and the IMF is problematic). 
 254. WTO Secretariat, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-
Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, (adopted July 23, 1996) [hereinafter Guidelines 
for Relations with NGOs], available at 
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 257. See WTO Secretariat, WTO Secretariat Activities with NGOs, WT/INF/30 (Apr. 
12, 2001), available at 
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 258. See id. 
1064 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:3 
based NGOs. 259 There is no means for ongoing monitoring or enforce-
ment by the WTO of the accountability of the NGOs with whom it 
works. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“Basel”) and the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) are trans-
governmental networks that set international financial standards.260 Alt-
hough their standards are soft law, they are widely adopted by national 
regulators.261 Neither has a mechanism to include NGOs in their stand-
ard-setting efforts.262 They do, however, accept comments from the pub-
lic, including NGOs, on their proposals.263 They have no limiting criteria 
                                                                                                             
 259. See id. In one dispute, Shrimp Turtle, the United States submitted amicus briefs of 
NGOs along with their own papers. Subsequently, in EC-Asbestos the Appellate Body 
adopted additional criteria for submissions fearing the high number of amicus briefs that 
would be submitted. Non-parties were required to apply for leave to file a submission. 
Upon review of the applications however, the Appellate Body denied all applicants leave. 
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 52–55, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). At the next 
general council of the WTO the members discussed and decided it was unacceptable for 
the Appellate Body to consider amicus briefs. Then in EC-Sardines the Appellate Body 
said it had the authority to accept non-party briefs (whether from organizations or a WTO 
member) but was not required to consider them. See Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 164, 167, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 
2002). According to the dispute settlement system training module, “the AB has never 
considered any unsolicited submission to be pertinent or useful, and thus, has never con-
sidered any that have been submitted.” Amicus Curiae Submissions, in DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE: PARTICIPATION IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
PROCEEDINGS ch. 9.3, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c9s3p1_e.htm (last 
visited May 16, 2011). 
 260. See generally About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited May 16, 2011) (Basel provides a forum for regular 
cooperation on banking supervisory matters); INT’L ORG. OF SECURITIES COMM’NS, 
http://www.iosco.org (last visited May 16, 2011) (IOSCO is recognized as an authority 
on international standards for securities markets). 
 261. See Roberta Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities 
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 883, 907 (2009) (“In adopting IOSCO’s disclosure 
standards for foreign private issuers, the SEC significantly changed the form, although 
not the content, of previous disclosure standards.”). 
 262. See generally Organisation and Governance, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/about/orggov.htm (last visited May 16, 2011); Structure of the Organ-
ization, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, 
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=structure (last visited May 16, 2011). 
 263. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 99 (2008) (noting that, while anyone can comment, Basel seeks 
comments primarily from banks, which are eager to participate in the notice and com-
ment process to protect their interests). 
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regarding who may submit comments and, therefore, no mechanisms for 
ongoing monitoring or enforcement.264 
Historically, the OECD involved NGOs in its work through its rela-
tionships with the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the 
OECD (“BIAC”), which consists of the industrial and employers’ associ-
ations of the OECD member countries and the Trade Union Advisory 
Committee to the OECD (“TUAC”), which consists of national trade 
union organizations from OECD countries.265 These groups have acted as 
intermediaries for a portion of civil society for some time.266 
The OECD has begun to reach out to civil society more broadly, con-
cluding a number of projects using civil society input.267 The level of 
civil society input varies from informal, periodic consultations to observ-
er status and full participation in meetings.268 The OECD has no accredi-
tation criteria for civil society participation in any of these roles. It also 
lacks any monitoring or enforcement provisions with respect to partici-
pating NGOs. 
As this summary of approaches demonstrates, the range of tools global 
regulators use to police NGO accountability varies greatly. Different 
                                                                                                             
 264. See id. 
 265. On-Line Guide to OECD Intergovernmental Activity, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., 
http://webnet.oecd.org/OECDGROUPS/Bodies/ListByNameView.aspx (last visited May 
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OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, corporate governance, fighting corrup-
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,en_2649_34495_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited May 16, 2011). 
 268. OECD, Policy Brief: Civil Society and the OECD 3 (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/3/35744346.pdf. 
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NSRs apply different criteria, to differing degrees, and some have no 
criteria at all. Generally speaking, UN organizations have gone the fur-
thest in adopting minimum criteria for NGO accreditation, with only 
ECOSOC, the WHO, and the Codex engaging in any level of ongoing 
monitoring and enforcement. Other organizations and networks have yet 
to adopt accreditation mechanisms and thus have no means to monitor or 
enforce NGO accountability on an ongoing basis. 
C. Enhancing NSRs’ Legitimacy by Improving their NGO Accountability 
Mechanisms 
NSRs have adopted accreditation, monitoring, and other nonprofit ac-
countability mechanisms to varying degrees. To an important extent, the-
se programs vary due to the roles that NGOs play in particular global 
regulatory contexts. When an NGO operates as an NSR itself, accredita-
tion is not appropriate. Rather, accountability mechanisms must be built 
into the NGO’s governance structure, perhaps with additional monitoring 
and enforcement capacity built up in the global regulatory community 
relying on the NSR. As discussed above, some NGOs have signed the 
NGO Accountability Charter, which is one route to such external en-
forcement of NGO NSRs.269 When an NGO instead participates in the 
work of another NSR, accreditation, monitoring, and enforcement mech-
anisms become viable and potentially crucial. NSRs considering adopt-
ing such mechanisms or reforming existing ones should consider three 
important factors: (1) the role, if any, envisioned for NGOs in the NSR’s 
legitimacy strategy, (2) the complementary enforcement mechanisms 
available under domestic nonprofit law, (3) and the ever-present consid-
erations of cost. 
1. The Role of NGOs in an NSR’s Legitimacy Strategy 
In cases of NGO participation in another NSR, the role of NGO in-
volvement the regulator desires or permits is pivotal in designing appro-
priate accreditation, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms. Increased 
reliance on the participation of NGOs as part of an NSR’s own legitima-
cy strategy should compel it to consider and often to adopt these mecha-
nisms for its participating NGOs. Without these mechanisms in place, an 
NSR risks self-sabotage. Of course, there are global regulators that have 
declined to cast NGOs as key players in their legitimacy strategies. For 
example, the WTO makes little use of NGOs to prop up its own legiti-
macy. This type of regulator, which makes no claim that it will truly en-
                                                                                                             
 269. Charter Members, INGO ACCOUNTABILITY CHARTER ORG., 
http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/list-of-signatories/ (last visited May 16, 2011). 
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gage NGOs in its regulatory project, may quite properly deem NGO ac-
creditation, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms unnecessary, if not 
a waste of valuable resources. 
When an NSR does deploy NGO participation as a significant element 
of its legitimacy strategy, however, the manner in which it does so is also 
important. NSRs sometimes draw in NGO participants to boost output 
legitimacy by obtaining needed expertise. Other times, NSRs desire 
NGO participation to bolster input legitimacy, by increasing the diversity 
of voices contributing to their regulatory project. When enhanced output 
legitimacy is the goal, accreditation, monitoring, and enforcement mech-
anisms should focus more on mission alignment than when input legiti-
macy is sought. NSRs seeking expertise primarily seek information and 
technical assistance from their consulting and partner NGOs, rather than 
insights into differing views on the normative goals of regulation. Thus, 
for example, the WHO’s accreditation requirements that provide that 
NGOs must be free from “concerns which are primarily of a commercial 
or profit-making nature”270 screens out a number NGOs whose non-
health interests might lead to a lack of mission alignment with the WHO. 
If a desire for increased input legitimacy predominates, significant 
mission alignment becomes less important, even counterproductive. Con-
firming the representativeness and transparency of participating NGOs, 
however, is crucial. Currently, criteria for NGOs participating in the ac-
tivities of the World Bank and IMF focus solely on the alignment of a 
given NGO’s mission with that of the regulator. Furthermore, even these 
criteria appear to be quite loosely applied. Yet, both the World Bank and 
the IMF have recently touted the engagement of civil society in support 
of the input legitimacy of their regulatory projects. The IMF Civil Socie-
ty web page touts its reliance on civil society for, inter alia, “the voice 
and representation of developing countries in the IMF and World 
Bank.”271 Likewise, the World Bank boasts a special website dedicated to 
civil society, and touts its active outreach “to civil society to share and 
discuss its policies, programs, studies, and projects.”272 
This level of engagement of NGOs in the work of the IMF and World 
Bank appears part of their legitimacy strategy to gain not only expertise, 
but also diversity of voice in their work, particularly when working with 
                                                                                                             
 270. WHA, Principles Governing Relations with NGOs, supra note 225. 
 271. Fact Sheet: The IMF and Civil Society Organizations, INT’L MONETARY FUND 
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/civ.htm. 
 272. Civil Society: Frequently Asked Questions, THE WORLD BANK, 
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developing countries. Accountability failures by the NGOs upon which 
the IMF and World Bank rely, however, would threaten the success of 
this legitimacy strategy. Rather than looking solely to mission alignment 
and accrediting virtually any organization mouthing the proper virtues, 
the IMF and World Bank should seriously consider a more robust ac-
creditation process, particularly to review the internal organizational and 
mission accountability of consulting NGOs. Providing for some ongoing 
monitoring and enforcement of these issues, as well as financial account-
ability of consulting NGOs, would impart even greater protection for its 
legitimacy strategy. 
Of course, global regulators may seek both input and output legitimacy 
from NGOs. The UN ECOSOC accreditation standards and ongoing 
monitoring of NGOs awarded general consultative status reinforce both 
types of legitimacy strategy. This system demands expertise, but requires 
a modest level of mission alignment, by seeking assurances that NGOs 
truly represent the particular fields in which they claim competence. Yet, 
they require only that an NGO’s aims and purposes be in general con-
formity with those of the UN. In fact, the system encourages NGO par-
ticipants to contribute to a normative dialogue, and to engage in such a 
dialogue internally, by obliging them to transmit minority views. Inter-
estingly, however, in the context of ECOSOC’s ongoing monitoring of 
NGOs in consultative status, mission alignment becomes more promi-
nent. NGO quadrennial reports must catalogue their interactions with the 
UN and justify the UN’s continued reliance on them as partners in a 
shared mission. 
Whenever involving NGOs in global regulation is part of the legitima-
cy strategy of a global regulator, NGO accountability is important. Un-
derstanding how NGOs are deployed in a given NSR’s legitimacy strate-
gy can help create more effective accountability mechanisms. 
2. The Complementary Role of Domestic Nonprofit Law 
NSRs creating or revising their accreditation, monitoring, and en-
forcement mechanisms also should tailor them to complement domestic 
nonprofit regulatory environments. When accreditation criteria are seri-
ous and complementary, and monitoring and enforcement are genuine, 
NGO participation in NSRs can help fill domestic accountability gaps. 
As discussed above, NGOs need mission accountability to safeguard 
their own legitimacy, but domestic nonprofit law provides little enforce-
ment of mission accountability.273 Ideally, an ongoing dialogue among 
NGO stakeholders regarding mission will provide mission accountabil-
                                                                                                             
 273. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
2011] NGOS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1069 
ity. NSR accreditation processes can spur just such a dialogue. For ex-
ample, the WHO accreditation criteria focus on NGOs’ development 
work in “health or health-related fields.”274 The requirement that the 
NGO submit a plan for collaboration focuses the NGO on mission as it 
relates to the WHO.275 Thus, the NGO must consider what its mission is, 
to then answer the question whether its mission aligns with WHO’s. This 
mission alignment exercise causes the NGO to discuss, consider, and 
reevaluate its mission. Even greater mission accountability could be 
gained if the WHO required this exercise to be done with input from the 
various stakeholders. 
In this respect, the focus of the ECOSOC accreditation criteria on or-
ganizational accountability is instructive. Domestic nonprofit law pro-
vides relatively little enforcement of organizational accountability. But if 
an NGO wants to be recognized by the United Nations, and if it wants 
the legitimacy boost that comes from such an acknowledgement, it will 
need to demonstrate that it has achieved at least nominal organizational 
accountability. This emphasis is not only in line with the overall goals 
and ethic of the UN, but also allows NSR accreditation to serve a useful 
complementary role to domestic enforcement, which will typically focus 
to a greater degree on NGOs’ financial accountability. The fact that the 
ECOSOC accreditation requirements say relatively little about financial 
accountability issues may not be damning, as it is here that domestic 
nonprofit regulation is most able and likely to enforce NGO accountabil-
ity. 
Other global regulatory systems for NGOs could be improved to focus 
more on this complementary role. When it comes to monitoring and en-
forcement of previously accredited NGOs, ECOSOC’s focus on NGO 
accountability becomes weaker and less complementary to domestic reg-
ulation. The quadrennial reporting requirements do not consider with 
much depth how a reporting NGO is internally handling the challenges 
of mission, organizational, and financial accountability. As noted above, 
these reports strongly emphasize mission alignment. In addition, though 
the Council Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations is empow-
ered to recommend removal of consultative status, it does not appear to 
be an aggressive enforcer. 
Of course, it might be onerous for some NGOs to provide financial 
disclosures like an annual report or financial statement, and it might be 
reasonable for NSRs to rely on domestic enforcement to ensure the fi-
nancial accountability of consulting NGOs. Thus, the ECOSOC process 
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demands for quadrennial reports focused on funding changes, rather than 
the overall financial health of the reporting NGO, might be justified. 
With regard to organizational and mission accountability disclosures, 
though, the ECOSOC monitoring process could certainly be improved. 
Currently, NGOs’ structures and governance are established as sufficient 
and bona fide in the accreditation process, and the quadrennial report 
must address changes to governance documents. Organizational account-
ability failures result, though, not from failure to enact governance struc-
tures, but from failure to use them. Without greatly expanding the re-
quired disclosures, the ECOSOC monitoring regime could ask how re-
porting NGOs have utilized their governance structures over the past four 
years, particularly with regard to policy initiatives or changes. Doing so 
would help educate NGOs about the importance of following the stric-
tures of their organizational forms. So too would requiring the NGOs to 
report on how they engaged a process for reviewing mission and the 
steps they take to pursue it on a quadrennial basis. Careful scrutiny of 
reports on these measures, especially if there were real sanctions like loss 
of consultative status, would represent a significant enforcement gain 
over domestic nonprofit regulation and would better ensure the internal 
legitimacy of the NGOs on which the UN relies. 
The WHO’s monitoring and enforcement is in some respects more rig-
orous than ECOSOC’s. The Standing Committee reviews collaboration 
every three years, forcing the WHO to focus on the relationship and on 
whether the criteria continue to be met, and whether the NGO has ful-
filled its promises of collaboration.276 Still, the stalled call for reform of 
the WHO accreditation procedures suggests that there might still be room 
for improvement.277 The proposed reforms would have required biennial 
reporting278 as well as automatic termination for the abuse of formal rela-
tions status.279 A review of the WHO relations with civil society also 
suggests reform of the accreditation procedures to better distinguish pub-
lic interest NGOs from those linked to commercial interest.280 
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3. The Ever-Present Question of Cost 
Finally, it bears noting that we do not recommend that every global 
regulator adopt its own comprehensive accreditation, monitoring, and 
enforcement apparatus to apply to the NGOs with which it works. Ac-
creditation, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms can be costly. Any 
responsible NSR must weigh the costs of these strategies against the val-
ue they provide in safeguarding its legitimacy strategy and make a con-
sidered decision about design and implementation. This is not to say that 
there is nothing a resource-strapped NSR can do. The Codex has adopted 
an intriguing review provision from this perspective. Although Codex 
does not mandate review or provide any protocol for regular review, it 
does automatically terminate observer status any time it finds that the 
NGO fails to participate in person or by written comments over a four 
year period. Provision for automatic culling of the NGO rolls on grounds 
of nonparticipation may be a way to pursue both output and input legiti-
macy at little cost. NGOs that do not participate in the workings of a 
global regulator add little to its store of expertise. Likewise, any claims 
that their involvement with the global regulator enhances its input legiti-
macy ring hollow. Yet, removing long inactive NGOs from a list of ob-
servers takes much less effort than would a substantive monitoring and 
enforcement process. Perhaps this type of prophylactic measure could be 
used more broadly by global regulators without the resources to devote 
to significant NGO policing mechanisms. 
Another means to curtail cost is the development of universal account-
ability standards. Harmonizing accountability standards would produce 
savings for NGOs and NSRs alike. As discussed above, the INGO Ac-
countability Charter establishes some fundamental accountability provi-
sions that could be used as the basis for a harmonized procedure.281 The 
Charter requires that NGOs be accountable to their missions, have “clear 
processes for adopting public policy positions,” be transparent, and ob-
serve principles of good governance.282 NSRs could require NGOs to 
                                                                                                             
 281. For a review of the Charter and its founding, see Diana Hortsch, Case Study: 
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sign and abide by the Accountability Charter as part of, or as a substitute 
for, individualized accreditation procedures. 
In addition, the Charter Company has plans to undertake substantial 
monitoring and enforcement procedures, from which NSRs could also 
greatly benefit. Signatories must comprehensively report annually to the 
Charter Company through the INGO Secretariat283 on their practices and 
structures using the Global Reporting Initiative’s (“GRI”) NGO Sector 
Supplement Framework.284 The GRI’s NGO Sector Supplement requires 
reporting on NGOs’ compliance with stated values, governance, and ef-
fectiveness.285 The Charter Company will review the reports annually.286 
The Accountability Charter is still in its infancy. In-depth review of its 
content and efficacy is an important project for future research. The val-
ue of an effective harmonized mechanism for certification, monitoring, 
and enforcement of NGO accountability is obvious and significant for 
NGOs themselves and for the global regulatory community. 
The optimal level of investment in NGO accountability will vary by 
global regulatory institution and perhaps over time.287 What is important, 
and the lesson of this Article, is that these costs must be considered by 
NSRs when they adopt legitimacy strategies relying on NGOs to increase 
their output, and especially input, legitimacy. Some of the costs of polic-
ing NGO accountability will be borne by domestic regulators and private 
stakeholders, but clearly not all. If some of this cost is not borne by the 
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NSRs that draft NGOs into their legitimacy strategies, the efforts to uti-
lize NGOs to boost the legitimacy of global regulation will be under-
mined. 
CONCLUSION 
As the participation of civil society and NGOs in international affairs 
has increased in recent years, much of the ensuing debate has focused on 
questioning why these NGOs should be allowed special influence. The 
concerns over NGO participation also raise a separate question of the 
appropriate criteria needed for NGO participation in global governance. 
This question is best answered with a view to NGO accountability as 
core to global regulators’ legitimacy strategies and as complementary to 
domestic regulation of NGOs as nonprofits. Some global regulators have 
already made significant steps in this direction; these efforts can be fur-
ther improved by keying accountability enforcement regimes to the legit-
imacy enhancement goals of a particular NSR and by focusing on the 
complementary role that NSR enforcement can play in domestic regula-
tion of NGOs. Global regulators that currently rely on NGO participation 
to prop up their own legitimacy but have not yet adopted these or other 
measures to track and ensure the accountability of the NGOs on which 
they rely, should act swiftly to remedy this considerable oversight. 
 
